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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I argue that it is problematic to assess Martin Heidegger’s 
concept of truth in isolation from his larger project.  I suggest that Ernst Tugendhat’s 
famous critique of Heidegger’s account of truth is emblematic of such an approach.  
Central to Heidegger’s project was the attempt to question the tradition of Western 
metaphysics and the presuppositions that we inherited from this tradition.  In 
Heidegger’s view, the concept of truth as no more than correctness is fundamentally 
rooted in this tradition.  Truth as correctness is precisely the notion of truth that 
Tugendhat advocates. 
I revisit Heidegger’s account of truth by reflecting upon Tugendhat’s famous 
critique.  I argue that Tugendhat and his followers do not take into account 
Heidegger’s general philosophical project and the way it led him to question the 
concept of truth as correctness.  In the end, they reinstate presuppositions that are 
precisely what Heidegger is bringing under question.  In some respects, these were 
the very presuppositions Heidegger was trying to call into question through his 
investigation into the concept of truth.  At the same time, I suggest that thinking 
through Tugendhat’s critique and attempting to formulate an adequate Heideggerian 
response gives us a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his 
general philosophical project. 
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φύσις χρύπτεσθαι φιλεĩ 
phusis kruptesthai philei 
Nature loves to hide 
Heraclitus1 
 
                                                
1 Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, “The Ionian Thinkers: Heraclitus of Ephesus,” in The Presocratic 
Philosophers, 2nd edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 192.  
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Introduction 
My aim in this dissertation is to reconsider Martin Heidegger’s notion of truth 
as alētheia in light of Ernst Tugendhat’s critique.  The central focus will be an 
analysis of Heidegger’s rethinking of the traditional concept of truth as correctness, 
Tugendhat’s response to Heidegger and the commentary this encounter has 
generated. 
I suggest that thinking through the encounter between Heidegger and 
Tugendhat allows for a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth 
and his general philosophical project.  I will draw attention to some problems with 
Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s account of truth.  I claim that by considering 
Heidegger’s account of truth in the context of his general philosophical approach we 
not only clarify the Heideggerian understanding of truth, but also elucidate the 
fundamental differences between Tugendhat’s and Heidegger’s approaches to 
philosophical problems. 
I aim to clarify Heidegger’s notion of truth as alētheia2 in order to assess the 
trenchancy of Tugendhat’s criticisms.  This will allow me to defend Heidegger 
against criticisms made by Tugendhat and other scholars who make a similar 
interpretation of Heidegger’s understanding of truth.  Making sense of Heidegger’s 
account of truth requires seeing how it is situated within his broader philosophical 
project.  I argue that it is necessary to understand Heidegger’s phenomenological-
hermeneutic approach because it shapes his critique of the traditional concept of truth 
as correctness. 
In order to elucidate Heidegger’s interpretation of truth, I offer a textual 
analysis of Heidegger’s account of truth in Being and Time, Tugendhat’s critique as 
he formulates it in “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” as well as commentaries from the 
secondary literature.  In order to present a fuller account of Heidegger’s analysis of 
truth, I will draw upon Heidegger’s later works.3  As noted, I will suggest there are 
                                                
2 Throughout this dissertation I will refer to truth as alētheia and truth as disclosedness 
interchangeably.  
3 Martin Heidegger, “Alētheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16),” in Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of 
Western Philosophy, translated by David Farrell & Frank Capuzzi, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
1984), 102-123; Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), translated by Richard 
Rojcewicz & Daniela Vallega-Neu, edited by John Sallis, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
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some weaknesses in Tugendhat’s critique.  However, whether or not Tugendhat’s 
criticisms undermine Heidegger’s analysis, consideration of these criticisms is 
fruitful since, I argue, it brings to the forefront Heidegger’s own critique of the 
Western philosophical tradition.  
Heidegger’s treatment of the problem of truth has been much disputed in the 
secondary literature.  In an influential contribution to this literature, “Heidegger’s 
Idea of Truth,”4 Tugendhat famously critiques Heidegger’s specific treatment of the 
concept of truth in Being and Time, §44.5  Although Tugendhat here directs his 
criticisms at §44 in particular, he claims that the objections he raises are pertinent to 
discussions of truth throughout Heidegger’s corpus.  From Tugendhat’s perspective, 
it is in §44 that Heidegger first lays the untenable foundations for his understanding 
of truth, which carry through to his later works.  
In broad strokes, Tugendhat argues that Heidegger’s determination of truth as 
disclosedness (alētheia) rests on an ambiguous use of the word “uncovering,” and 
fails to account for the agreement (adaequatio) relation specific to the concept of 
truth.  For Tugendhat, Heidegger’s determination of truth as disclosedness offers no 
criterion for distinguishing true from false statements.  Put differently, Heidegger’s 
definition fails to specify the meaning of truth in a sense distinct from falsity.  
Moreover, Tugendhat argues, it is on the basis of this ambiguity that Heidegger 
extends the concept of truth beyond the domain of the statement to any and every 
disclosure, ultimately forfeiting the notion of justificatory grounds (certitūdō) on the 
basis of which we might, according to Tugendhat, engage in critical questioning. 
The trenchancy of Tugendhat’s critique has been a controversial discussion 
point for Heideggerian scholarship since Tugendhat first raised these objections 
                                                                                                                                     
2012); Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in Pathmarks, translated by John Sallis, edited 
by William McNeill, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 136-54; Martin Heidegger, 
Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, translated by Joan Stambaugh, (Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 1985); Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Off the Beaten Track, 
translated & edited by Julian Young & Kenneth Haynes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 1-56. 
4 Ernst Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” in Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Vol. 3, 
edited and translated by Christopher Macann, 79-92, (London: Routledge, 1992); Originally published 
in German as "Heideggers Idee von Wahrheit," in Heidegger: Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werks, 
edited by Otto Pöggeler, 286–297, (Cologne and Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969); Tugendhat 
formulates a longer version this critique (yet to be translated into English) in the final arguments of 
his habilitation thesis, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1967).  
5 Martin Heidegger, “§44 Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth,” in Being and Time, translated by Joan 
Stambaugh, 204-220, 2nd ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010). 
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during a lecture in 1964.6  An assessment of the extent to which Tugendhat’s critique 
undermines Heidegger’s interpretation of the concept of truth becomes all the more 
pressing in light of Heidegger’s lecture, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking,”7 (delivered only months after Tugendhat’s initial lecture of 1964), in 
which Heidegger seemingly retreats from his account of truth in Being and Time. 
In chapter one, then, I will outline Heidegger’s phenomenological-hermeneutic 
approach before explicating his analysis of the traditional concept of truth.  
Recognising the importance of his phenomenological-hermeneutic approach sheds 
light on Heidegger’s discussion of the meaning of truth and his particular way of 
framing this discussion.  An understanding of Heidegger’s “framework” will enable 
us to better understand Heidegger’s critique of the traditional concept of truth and his 
suggestion that we need to re-think truth in its most original, that is, primordial 
sense, namely, what he refers to as truth as disclosedness.  
Then, in chapter two, in order to later formulate a response to Tugendhat and 
show that thinking through Tugendhat’s criticisms allows us to better understand 
Heidegger’s interpretation of truth, I turn to Tugendhat’s critique.  I explicate the 
criticisms he raises with respect to Heidegger’s account of truth as disclosedness.  In 
this chapter I also examine arguments put forth in a selection of the secondary 
literature from both defenders of Heidegger and proponents of Tugendhat’s critique.  
In the third and final chapter, drawing upon Heidegger’s account of truth and 
method in Being and Time (outlined in chapter one), as well as some of his later 
works, I show why – from Heidegger’s perspective – these commentaries are 
problematic and sketch what I argue is a possible response to Tugendhat’s criticisms.  
In order to clarify what Tugendhat finds problematic with Heidegger’s analysis of 
the traditional concept of truth, I will draw attention to Tugendhat’s commitment to a 
conception of truth conceived strictly in terms of correctness, an untenable position 
according to Heidegger’s account of truth.  I will close this chapter by reflecting 
upon the challenge Heidegger puts to his readers.  The task, as he stresses, is to 
question the prevalent notion of truth as correctness and attempt to rethink truth in a 
more original sense.  
                                                
6 Daniel Dahlstrom, "The Clearing and Its Truth: Reflections on Tugendhat's Criticisms and 
Heidegger's Concessions." Études Phénoménologiques 37-38 (2003), 3-4 
7 Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” in On Time and Being, 
translated by Joan Stambaugh, 55-73, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). 
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I will show that, if we properly grasp Heidegger’s position, Tugendhat and his 
followers do not take into account Heidegger’s general philosophical project and the 
way it led him to question the concept of truth as correctness.  In the end, they 
reinstate presuppositions in their account of truth that are precisely what Heidegger is 
bringing under question. 
I conclude by suggesting that some of the fundamental differences between the 
philosophical approaches of Heidegger and Tugendhat have remained obscure in the 
commentary on this topic.  These differences are unlikely to be reconciled by 
convincing arguments from either side because there is strong disagreement about 
what is to count as “convincing.”  Moreover it is difficult to grasp the problems 
Heidegger poses and the presuppositions he wants us to question.  Yet, as I suggested 
at the beginning, revisiting these debates allows for a better understanding of 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic project and his reflections upon the traditional concept of 
truth.  Furthermore, we can only properly grasp Heidegger’s account of truth by 
situating it within the context of his general philosophical approach.  It is by 
considering Heidegger’s more general approach that we also bring to the fore the 
fundamentally different philosophical approaches of Tugendhat and Heidegger and 
some of the limitations of Tugendhat’s critique. 
 11 
Heidegger on Method and Truth in Being and Time 
In order to use Tugendhat’s critique to better understand Heidegger’s concept 
of truth, we first have to explicate two things.  First, I will explain the 
phenomenological-hermeneutic character of Heidegger’s investigations in Being and 
Time to contextualise his account of truth.  As I have already noted in the 
introduction, Heidegger’s discussions of truth are better understood by considering 
within his broader interpretive approach to philosophy.  Second, I sketch 
Heidegger’s treatment of the concept of truth in Being and Time, §44.  This sketch 
will bring to the fore the key objections of Tugendhat’s critique. In the final chapter, 
I will refer back to this initial sketch of Heidegger position and his philosophical 
approach in order to suggest possible presuppositions upon which Tugendhat’s 
critique rests. 
In order to achieve the first of these two aims, I outline what Heidegger means 
by phenomenology and why, according to Heidegger, his investigations in Being and 
Time are phenomenological.  Then, I explicate Heidegger’s account of the 
hermeneutic-interpretive way he carries out his phenomenological investigations.  
Understanding the broader context of Heidegger’s thought and the way he carries out 
his questioning allows us to approach his specific treatment of the concept of truth 
with some preliminary insight.  We will be in a better position to understand why and 
how Heidegger formulates the problem of truth and to clarify what he finds 
problematic in the modern conception. 
Having outlined Heidegger’s broader project and the manner in which he 
carries out his investigations I embark upon the second task of this chapter, that is, an 
explication of Heidegger’s treatment of truth in Being and Time.  I begin this second 
task by laying out Heidegger’s inquiry into the traditional concept of truth and the 
ontological presuppositions it entails, before clarifying Heidegger’s interpretation of 
the most original phenomenon of truth as disclosedness.  
With the first aim in view, I now turn to Heidegger’s explication of his method 
of philosophical investigation as he lays it out in Being and Time.  As already 
suggested, without properly understanding Heidegger’s philosophical approach, his 
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reasons for and method of exploring such traditional philosophical problems – such 
as the problem of truth – will remain obscure. 
§1 Method 
In the introduction of Being and Time Heidegger proposes to treat the question 
of the meaning of Being8 phenomenologically.  Phenomenology, he explains, is 
letting what shows be seen from itself just as it shows itself.  To clarify what it 
means to carry out phenomenological inquiry, Heidegger sketches the meaning of 
phenomenology as a formal concept of method.9  In this sense, phenomenology is a 
formal method disregarding particular content.  Heidegger accepts this general 
concept of a formal phenomenological method but derives from it his hermeneutic 
approach.  
§1.1 Phenomenology as a Formal Concept of Method 
Heidegger delineates the formal concept of phenomenology, that is, 
phenomenology understood strictly as a method without reference to content, by 
clarifying the meaning of the words “phenomenon” and “logos,” in terms of their 
etymological origins.  According to Heidegger, the word phenomenon originally 
derives from the ancient Greek term phainomenon [φαινóµενον].10  The word 
phainomenon, he explains, is itself drawn from the verb phainesthai [φαίνεσϑαι], 
which means, ‘to show itself.’11  Phainomenon means, ‘what shows itself, the self-
showing, the manifest.’12  Heidegger interprets the term phainesthai as an 
appropriation of the verb phainō [φαίνω], which means to bring or place into the 
light – the root of this word is pha- [φα-], or phos [φῶς], which means “light.”13  
Light illuminates a place where something can show itself.  While beings can, on the 
one hand, manifest as they are themselves, they can, on the other, manifest as 
something they are not, that is, manifest as something other than they themselves are.  
If a being shows itself as something it is not, Heidegger explains, it “seems” like 
                                                
8 For the sake of clarity and ease of expression, throughout this dissertation I capitalise the word 
“Being” when I use it in the sense of “the Being of beings” [Sein], and refrain from capitalising, 
keeping with “being,” when I use the word in the sense of particular beings [seiendes]. 
9 Edmund Husserl first developed this formal concept of phenomenological method. 
10 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 2nd edition, (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2010), 27 [28] 
11 Heidegger, Being and Time, 27 [28] 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid. 
 13 
something other than what it is.14  This self-showing, seeming like, Heidegger calls 
“semblance.”15  Semblance is a privative modification (and thus not the opposite) of	  
phenomenon.16  In other words, semblance is still a self-showing, only not self-
showing in the original sense Heidegger means when he speaks of phenomenon.  
Heidegger further distinguishes between appearances and phenomena: an 
appearance is not a phenomenon, although what appears does so only on the basis of 
some phenomenon.  Heidegger differentiates his account of the relationship between 
appearance, phenomenon and the thing itself from those of his philosophical 
predecessors.  He warns against the tendency to collapse the distinction between self-
showing and appearing and points to Immanuel Kant’s account of appearances and 
phenomena as an example of such a collapse.17  Similar to what Heidegger takes to 
be Kant’s account, and in contrast to Heidegger himself, Tugendhat understands 
“what shows” as appearances that emanate from the things themselves.18  In other 
words, in opposition to Heidegger, he aligns appearances and phenomena while 
separating phenomena from the things themselves.  
Heidegger, by contrast, precisely identifies the things themselves as what 
shows, that is, as phenomena.  Thus, Heidegger does not accept the separation of 
phenomena from things themselves.  In addition, for Heidegger, a phenomenon does 
not appear, rather, it indicates what appears; nor does what appear self-show, rather, 
it announces itself through what shows itself.19  With the formal concept of 
phenomenon clarified and given in its distinction from and relation with semblance, 
appearance, and things themselves, Heidegger then turns to the task of clarifying the 
meaning of the formal concept of logos. 
According to Heidegger, in ancient Greece the word logos [λóγος] was used in 
a variety of senses.  However, in the works of Plato and Aristotle, he claims that the 
different meanings of logos converge in a primary meaning: logos as discourse 
                                                
14 Heidegger, Being and Time, 27 [29] 
15 ibid. 
16 ibid. 
17 For Heidegger’s interpretation of the relation between appearance, phenomena and things-in-
themselves in Kant, see 28-30 [30-31] 
18 In this sense, Heidegger’s discussion of Kant is relevant to Tugendhat’s position. Heidegger 
describes Kant’s account of the relation between appearances, phenomena, and the things themselves 
in the following fashion: ‘[w]hat does the announcing and is brought forward indeed shows itself in 
such a way that, as the emanation of what it announces, it precisely and continually veils what it is in 
itself’ (Heidegger, Being and Time, 29 [30]). 
19 Heidegger, Being and Time, 28 [29] 
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[Rede].20  This basic sense of logos21 means “letting be seen,” making beings 
manifest through speech and is evident in Aristotle’s account of discourse as apo-
phainesthai [άποφαίνεσϑαι].22  Apophantic speech, according to Heidegger’s 
interpretation, lets something be seen, makes it manifest, specifically by indicating it; 
that is, by letting it be seen (apart from itself and together with something else) as 
something.23  That is, when we speak about things around us and far away, we make 
these things manifest for others by showing them through speech.  In this way, 
Heidegger explains: 
… λóγος [logos] lets something be seen, it can therefore be true or false.  But 
everything depends on staying clear of any concept of truth construed in the sense of 
"correspondence" or "accordance" [Übereinstimmung].  This idea is by no means the 
primary one in the concept of ἀλήεϑια [alētheia].  The "being true" of λóγος as 
ἀληϑεύειν [aletheuein] means: to take beings that are being talked about in λέγειν 
[legein] as άποφαίνεσϑαι [apophainesthai] out of their concealment; to let them be 
seen as something unconcealed (ἀλήϑές [alethes]); to discover them.  Similarly "being 
false," ψεύδεσϑαι [pseudesthai], is tantamount to deceiving in the sense of covering 
up: putting something in front of something else (by way of letting it be seen) and 
thereby passing it off as something it is not.24  
In other words, and as I will further explicate below, true assertion uncovers what is 
being spoken about just as it shows itself as unconcealed, in contrast to the false 
assertion that covers over what shows, letting it manifest as something it does not 
show itself as and therefore passing it off for something it is not.25 
In accord with the account of logos just outlined, Heidegger defines the 
meaning of the formal concept of logos with respect to phenomenology as a formal 
concept of method.  Logos is to be understood in the sense of logos as apophansis.  
That is, Heidegger proposes to let the phenomenon of phenomenological 
investigation be seen by others through apophantic speech.  In light of the discussion 
to follow, it is important to note that Heidegger explicitly identifies apophantic 
speech as being either true or false in the sense of “discovering” beings and 
“covering over” beings respectively. 
                                                
20 Heidegger, Being and Time, 30 [32] 
21 See also: Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, translated by Daniel 
Dahlstrom, (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005), 9-31 
22 Heidegger, Being and Time, 30 [32]. See also: Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: 
Prolegomena, translated by Theodore Kisiel, (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1992), 80-89 
23 Heidegger, Being and Time, 31 [33]. See also: Martin Heidegger, Logic: The Question of Truth, 
translated by Thomas Sheehan, (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), 107-
135 
24 Heidegger, Being and Time, 31 [33], German in square brackets in Stambaugh’s translation. 
25 See also: Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, 23-29 
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With the meaning of the formal concept of phenomenon clarified as self-
showing and that of logos as a mode of letting-be-seen, Heidegger establishes the 
formal concept of phenomenology as, apophainesthai ta phainomena [άποφαίνεσϑαι 
τà φαινóµενα].26  That is, for Heidegger, phenomenology as a formal concept of 
method means, ‘to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself 
from itself.’27  In other words, the kind of investigations Heidegger intends to carry 
out will involve in the first place, a particular manner of encountering things so as to 
let them show as they are themselves.  Second, it entails a way of letting what shows 
be seen by others, that is, Heidegger will make the phenomenon of his 
phenomenological investigations manifest for others through apophantic speech.  
§1.2 Deformalising the Formal Concept of Phenomenology 
According to Heidegger, there are two distinct ways in which one can go about 
deformalising the formal concept of phenomenology.  The distinction between the 
two ways lies in whether one takes up particular beings or the Being of beings itself 
as that which is under investigation, as what is to be encountered as phenomenon.28  
Heidegger wants to distance himself from the “vulgar,” common concept of 
phenomenon.  If we take manifesting in the most original sense to pertain to beings, 
then we arrive at the common concept of phenomenon.29  Whereas if we understand 
manifesting in the most original sense as pertaining to the Being of beings then we 
arrive at the phenomenological concept of phenomenon.30  The common concept 
construes phenomenon as beings given for apprehension in empirical experience.31  
However, empirical experience does not mean beings as they initially show 
themselves in everyday, pretheoretical experience; rather, it is precisely this 
everyday pretheoretical experience that is passed over by the common concept of 
phenomenon.  This theoretical standpoint founded upon the common concept of 
phenomenon determines (a priori) what is to be encountered as phenomenon and 
investigated as such.32 
                                                
26 Heidegger, Being and Time, 32 [34] 
27 ibid. 
28 Heidegger, Being and Time, 29-30 [31] 
29 Heidegger, Being and Time, 33 [35] 
30 ibid. 
31 Heidegger, Being and Time, 29 [31] 
32 See also: Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World View," Boundary 24, no. 2. Martin Heidegger 
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By contrast, genuine phenomenological concepts are distinguishable from 
other common concepts precisely in terms of their autochthonous condition, that is, 
the condition of remaining explicitly bound to the context in which they arose.  Thus 
phenomenological concepts are drawn from what shows and do not determine in 
advance what is to be encountered as phenomenon.  This context-bound character of 
phenomenological concepts grants these concepts an inherent flexibility.  However, 
despite this flexibility, Heidegger claims there is a risk that phenomenological 
concepts will be interpreted rigidly, as static and unchanging.  That is, they will be 
understood regard for the historical ground on the basis of which they were first 
conceived.  The potential inflexibility of a phenomenological concept, Heidegger 
explains, renders the concept open to the possibility of losing its autochthony and 
becoming a ‘free-floating thesis.’33  Accordingly, anyone genuinely practicing 
phenomenology must remain ‘self-critical in a positive sense.’34  In other words, the 
genuine phenomenologist remains open to rethinking even the most clear and distinct 
concepts.  The phenomenological concept of phenomenon in contrast to the common 
one is not absolutely defined, ready for application in any and every context; rather, 
it is determinable only in terms of and as bound to the unique context in which it is 
sought.  
Having clarified the deformalised concept of phenomenon, Heidegger then 
clarifies the concept of logos he will follow in his hermeneutical investigations.  For 
Heidegger, the meaning of the deformalised phenomenological concept of logos 
must be drawn from the phenomenon of phenomenological inquiry.35  That is, it is 
the phenomenon itself which shapes the way it we will be encountered.  In the 
context of Being and Time, the phenomenon is the Being of beings.  In order to 
clarify the appropriate way of encountering the Being of beings, Heidegger explains, 
we will first bring to view the Being of a particular being.36  Specifically, the being 
who asks after the meaning of Being.  
Heidegger takes as his point of departure an analysis of the Being of that being 
who asks after Being, or as he calls it, an existential analysis of Dasein.  Dasein is 
                                                
33 Heidegger, Being and Time, 34 [36] 
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35 Heidegger, Being and Time, 34-35 [36-37] 
36 Heidegger, Being and Time, 35 [37] 
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Heidegger’s term for the structure of human existence.37  From his existential 
analysis we will come to grasp the specific sense of logos (mode of making manifest) 
as interpretation.38  Thus, the analysis itself is “hermeneutics” in the original sense of 
the word, which names the task of interpretation.39  From the existential analysis we 
arrive at the fundamentally interpretive character of our Being.  Hence, interpretation 
becomes the proper method of approaching the question of Being.  
For Heidegger, going back to the genuine phenomenal origins of our concepts 
and rethinking them, reinterpreting prior understandings that have been covered over 
by subsequent attempts to interpret Being as a particular being allows us a ‘passage 
through’40 the ruling dogmas.  As we will see, this is precisely the manner in which 
Heidegger approaches the concept of truth. 
So far in this chapter, I have sketched the overarching inquiry in terms of 
which Heidegger carries out his specific investigation into the meaning of truth and 
the manner in which Heidegger conducts his investigations as phenomenological 
hermeneutics.  An important step on the way to Heidegger’s rethinking of the 
meaning of Being is clarification of the meaning of truth.  Heidegger argues that the 
traditional concept of truth as agreement, although accepted by the Western tradition, 
is already defined by certain ontological presuppositions.  Heidegger devotes §44 of 
Being and Time to analysing the traditional concept of truth and exposing the 
ontological presuppositions it entails.  
For the remainder of this chapter, I will lay out Heidegger’s treatment of the 
concept of truth in Being and Time.  Here we will see Heidegger’s 
phenomenological-hermeneutic approach at play.  I will first sketch Heidegger’s 
inquiry into the grounds of the traditional concept of truth as correctness, before 
explicating Heidegger’s interpretation of the most original phenomenon of truth as 
disclosedness.  
                                                
37 Dasein is often translated into English by scholars, and formulated in reverse, as “being-here” or “-
there.” For this dissertation I have chosen not to translate this technical term of Heidegger’s; 
preferring, rather to leave it in its original German voice which captures both the “here” and “there” in 
“Da.” That the meaning of Dasein remains obscure is not a problem for Heidegger nor should it be for 
us.  
38 Heidegger, Being and Time, 35 [37] 
39 ibid. 
40 Heidegger, Being and Time, 34 [37] 
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§2 Truth 
§2.1 Questioning the Grounds of the Traditional Concept of Truth 
Heidegger contends that according to the present way of thinking, which we 
have inherited from the Western philosophical tradition, truth is a property of 
statements.  To say that a statement is true means it is in agreement with whatever it 
is about.  Heidegger notes that those who align themselves with this traditional 
concept of truth as agreement often point to Aristotle as the first philosopher to 
locate truth in judgment.41  However, according to Heidegger, this is already a re-
interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of truth.  This reinterpretation, he explains, finds 
its classic articulation in Thomas Aquinas.42  Aquinas defines the essence of truth as 
adaequatio et rei, in other words, the essence of truth consists in agreement of 
knowledge with thing.43  However, for Aquinas and the theological tradition more 
generally God is the guarantor of this relation.  In the Christian theological 
framework the human intellect (ens creatum) is fundamentally linked with the ideas 
preconceived in the mind of God (intellectus divinus).44  Heidegger contends that 
Kant must also be situated in this tradition of characterising truth in terms of the 
agreement of knowledge with its object.  For example, Heidegger quotes as stating 
the following: ‘[t]he explanation of the name of truth – namely, that it is the 
agreement of knowledge with its object – will be here granted and presupposed.’45  
By Heidegger’s account, this tradition of construing truth in terms of agreement of 
knowledge with its object, expressed in propositional terms, is characteristic of 
modern epistemological approaches to truth. 
From the standpoint of modern epistemology, as Heidegger understands it, 
truth is construed as a relation between a knowing subject and a known object.46  The 
major problem of the modern inquiry concerning the possibility of truth becomes the 
nature of the relation between two distinct beings, understood as two distinct 
substances: intellectus et res.47  Heidegger’s criticism of the attempt to render the 
meaning of truth as a mere relation that bridges the gap between these two 
                                                
41 Heidegger, Being and Time, 206 [214] 
42 Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality and Politics, translated by Richard Regan, edited by William 
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43 Heidegger, Being and Time, 206 [214] 
44 Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” 138-139 
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46 Heidegger, Being and Time, 208 [217] 
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substances makes clear that bridged this gap for Aquinas – namely, God – is no 
longer considered a satisfactory solution to this problem and thus the gap continues 
to haunt the modern epistemological project.48  From Heidegger’s perspective, 
modern epistemological inquiry does not seek out the grounds of the agreement 
relation; rather, it presupposes the relation and then takes this as a basis for an 
investigation into how and whether we can bridge the gap, that is, know, and attain 
truth.49  
Having briefly outlined some of the history of this relation between statement 
and thing Heidegger now explores this relation in more detail.  “Agreement” 
designates a kind of relation of something with something.  Heidegger clarifies the 
specific agreement relation of knowledge or statement and thing.50  And yet there are 
various modes of agreement, not all of which are suited to the task of characterising 
that specific relation between statement and thing.51  For example, as Heidegger 
notes, agreement can mean equality.52  In the case of two blue lighters of the same 
make and colour, we can say that they are equal to each other.  However, the issue 
for Heidegger is how a statement and a thing can be equal with each other, since they 
are not of the same kind.  For Heidegger, the blue lighter and the statement, “this is a 
blue lighter,” cannot be in agreement in the same way as the two lighters are, since 
the lighter and the statement about it are essentially different.53  The lighter there on 
the table in front of me is material but my statement is nothing material.  How can 
they be in agreement with each other?  Thus Heidegger’s task is to inquire into the 
possibility of grasping this relational agreement in a phenomenological way. 
Heidegger inquires into how a thing and a statement can be said to agree with 
each other.  According to Heidegger, my statement can agree with the thing when my 
assertion makes visible the thing as the very thing before me.  For example, I say to 
my friend, “the picture hanging on the back of the door is crooked.”  We go to the 
door to look, and see that the picture is, indeed, hung crooked.  By stating that the 
picture on the wall is crooked, I make visible this “being-crooked” to my friend.  We 
                                                
48 For further discussion of this point, see: Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” 138-139; 
Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, 137-142 & 168-174 
49 Heidegger, Being and Time, 208 [217] 
50 Although we are addressing the agreement of knowledge or statement with thing, for the sake of 
clarity I will use the word statement in place of “knowledge or statement.” 
51 Heidegger, Being and Time, 207 [215-216] 
52 ibid. 
53 Heidegger, Being and Time, 207 [216] 
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look at the picture and the picture shows itself as crooked.  My seeing the painting 
hanging there demonstrates ‘that this being is the very being [Seiende] that was 
meant in the statement.’54  This demonstration confirms that the statement does in 
fact discover that which it points out.55  It is only on the basis of the thing showing 
itself that the possibility of confirmation arises.  In seeing the picture hanging there, 
Heidegger explains, the thing I was originally directed toward in making the 
statement, ‘shows that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it is discovered or pointed out 
in the statement.’56  That is, the picture shows just as it is pointed out and determined 
by my statement.  The phrase “just as,” indicates the relational agreement of 
statement with thing.57  The agreement relation comes to the fore with the 
confirmation that the statement discovers the thing.  
As we noted above, true assertion shows things just as they show themselves 
for us.  In other words, the truth of assertion is not a mere relation between two 
objectively present things (i.e., intellectus et res).  Rather, assertion is a mode of 
Being of Dasein.  That is, it is something that we do in our meaningful engagements 
and in our shared world.  Since assertion is, as shown above, a manner of letting 
things be seen specifically by indicating, we have two possibilities open to us with 
respect to the manner in which we make assertions and make the things we talk 
about manifest to others.  The two possibilities pertain to the distinction between true 
and false assertion.  On the one hand, as Heidegger explains, ‘[t]o say that a 
statement is true means that it discovers the being in itself.  It asserts, it shows, it lets 
beings “be seen” (άπóφανσις) [apophansis] in their discoveredness.'58  That is, we 
can let something be seen as it shows itself to us (letting it be seen in its 
“discoveredness”).  On the other hand, however, we can also let it be seen as 
something other than what it shows itself to be, thereby covering it up and passing it 
off as something it is not.  In this way, by making a false statement about a thing, I 
am covering it over, whereas by making a true statement about a thing, I am dis-
covering it.  As Heidegger writes, ‘[t]he being true [Wahrsein] (truth) of the 
statement must be understood as discovering.’59  
                                                
54 Heidegger, Being and Time, 209 [218] 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid. 
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58 Heidegger, Being and Time, 210 [218]  
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§2.2 The Most Original Phenomenon of Truth as Disclosedness 
Heidegger asks if by defining truth (in the sense of the being-true of the 
statement) as discovering, do we not shake off the tried-and-true tradition and 
eliminate the agreement relation from the concept of truth?60  No, he says, there is no 
omission here; rather, truth as discovering is a more original interpretation of the 
traditional concept of truth.61  A conception of truth construed merely as adaequatio 
is limited to judgment inasmuch as it does not take into account the original self-
showing on the basis of which such a conception of agreement could in the first 
place arise.  After all, only when something is discovered in its showing, can we 
speak about it.  The true assertion derives its manner of showing from the things as 
they are discovered.  That is, the true assertion lets ‘beings be seen in their 
unconcealment (discoveredness), taking them out of their concealment.’62  To judge 
that something is as it is, we must be able first to encounter it, or, as Heidegger says, 
only if ‘a being is discovered in its [B]eing,’63 we can speak about it. 
The idea of the discoveredness of beings relates to the Heideggerian concept of 
understanding.  Heidegger speaks about understanding with respect to the 
discoveredness of beings, whereby ‘Dasein is the ontic condition of the possibility of 
the discovery of beings.’64  Dasein ‘is cleared in itself as being-in-the-world, not by 
another being, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing.’65  As Heidegger writes, 
‘Dasein is its disclosedness.’66  Without being open to things in the world, which 
show themselves, without the possibility of Dasein discovering them and so being 
able to speak about them, there cannot be propositions concerning them. 
Heidegger explains that things must be first disclosed in order for them to be 
discovered.  As Heidegger makes clear, ‘discoveredness [Entdecktheit] [is] the term 
for a possibility of [B]eing of all beings unlike Dasein.’67  Yet, in order for beings to 
be discovered, they have to be freed and disclosed.  Dasein frees beings by 
encountering and discovering them in terms of our meaningful projects, that is, as 
letting them be relevant for a “totality of relevance.”  Only because Dasein is that 
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disclosedness that makes possible an encounter with things, can speak about 
something as something.  Without disclosure, no discovery is possible; without 
discovery, there is no possibility of propositions. 
Let us now turn to §44 and in particular the part of this section in which he 
draws together the various threads of his discussion of truth.  Truth for him is tied to 
this possibility of discovering and discoveredness of things,68 which is grounded in a 
more original phenomenon.  As noted above, we discover things in the world on the 
basis of our being-in-the-world.69  The being that has this fundamental structure is 
Dasein.  As Heidegger makes clear, ‘[t]hrough disclosedness this being (Dasein) is 
“there” for itself together with the there-being [Da-sein] of the world.’70  
Accordingly, for Heidegger, ‘the discoveredness of innerworldly beings is grounded 
in the disclosedness of the world.’71  In other words, we are always thrown into the 
world ahead of ourselves.  We encounter, that is, discover the things and people 
around us on the basis of the prior disclosure of the world, that is, we understand 
things in terms of our prior engagement with them in terms of our projects.  Only by 
being-in-the-world, Dasein discloses the world and only through disclosure is the 
discoveredness of beings possible.  
For Heidegger Dasein is fundamentally “in truth.”  This means, as Heidegger 
explains, that ‘the disclosedness of its ownmost [B]eing belongs to…[Dasein’s] 
existential constitution.’72  Thus, for Heidegger, truth in the most original sense 
means disclosedness.  This interpretation pertains to the most original phenomenon 
of truth as the disclosure of the world, of the “there,” which is the original ground on 
the basis of which truth as discovering is in the first place possible.73 
Hence, for Heidegger, ‘Dasein is “in the truth.”’74  This is an ontological and 
not an ontic statement.  To be “in truth” does not mean that Dasein is always truthful 
in the sense of correctness.  Part of Dasein’s fundamental structure involves 
thrownness, project and falling prey.  That is to say, Dasein is disclosed as thrown, 
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fallen, project.75  All of them are constitutive of the everydayness of Dasein.  For 
Heidegger, then, “Dasein is in the truth,” and “Dasein is in untruth.”76  We are 
“thrown” into the world and already find ourselves situated in the world and 
entangled in our relations with things and others.  Everydayness is constituted by idle 
talk, curiosity, ambiguity.77  Initially and for the most part we understand ourselves 
in terms of ready-made theses, handed down by the public anonym, the “they.”  We 
have always already “fallen prey” to the world.  Our original, truthful relation to 
beings, which is constitutive of our existence is ‘essentially closed off and covered 
over.’78  Falling prey ‘reveals an essential, ontological structure of Dasein itself.  Far 
from determining its nocturnal side, it constitutes all of its days in their 
everydayness.’79 
Conclusion 
As already suggested, understanding the broader context of Heidegger’s 
thought and the way he understands his philosophical inquiry allows us to approach 
his treatment of the concept of truth.  Without properly understanding Heidegger’s 
philosophical approach, his reasons for and method of exploring traditional 
philosophical problems, such as the problem of truth, will remain obscure. 
In light of the significance of Heidegger’s phenomenological-hermeneutic 
framework, in this chapter, I have explicated the way Heidegger’s particular 
approach informs his inquiry into the traditional concept of truth.  I explained what 
Heidegger means by phenomenology and why, according to Heidegger, his 
investigations in Being and Time are phenomenological.  Then, I unpacked 
Heidegger’s account of his own hermeneutic-interpretive manner of engaging in 
phenomenological analysis.  With an understanding of Heidegger’s broader project 
and the manner in which he carries out his investigations I then explicated 
Heidegger’s treatment of truth in Being and Time.  I first considered Heidegger’s 
inquiry into the traditional concept of truth and the ontological presuppositions it 
entails, before clarifying Heidegger’s interpretation of the most original phenomenon 
of truth as disclosedness. 
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In the following chapter, in order to address and clarify Tugendhat’s critique, I 
will give a detailed exposition of the objections Tugendhat raises against 
Heidegger’s account of truth.  It is important to clarify Tugendhat’s objections before 
moving on to examine some of the ways Tugendhat’s critique has been taken up in 
the secondary literature.  When I further discuss these commentaries in the final 
chapter, I will return to some of the points raised in the present chapter in order to 
show how they problematise certain criticisms directed at Heidegger’s account of 
truth as disclosedness.  For now, however, we turn our attention to Tugendhat and 
afford him the attention we have so far only given to Heidegger. 
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Tugendhat’s Critique of §44 
In this chapter I address Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s account of truth 
and consider some of the ways Tugendhat’s critique has been taken up in the 
secondary literature.  In the previous chapter, I have offered an explanation of 
Heidegger’s phenomenological-hermeneutic account of the concept of truth.  To 
extend my discussion of Heidegger’s account, in this chapter I will unpack 
Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as presented in his paper, 
“Heidegger’s Idea of Truth.”  This particular critique has been taken up by a number 
of scholars and is often mentioned in discussions of Heidegger’s thought.  It would 
be difficult to find many commentaries on Heidegger’s concept of truth that do not at 
least in passing make reference to Tugendhat’s critique.  I will here explore this 
critique to make clear the problems Tugendhat finds in Heidegger’s concept of truth.  
As I claimed above, a proper analysis of Tugendhat’s critique will enable us to better 
understand Heidegger’s project.  I will return to this claim in chapter three when I 
offer a possible Heideggerian response to these criticisms. 
Firstly, I will explicate Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s account of truth as 
disclosedness (alētheia) in order to make clear what Tugendhat finds problematic in 
Heidegger’s account.  Following an exposition of Tugendhat’s critique, I will turn to 
some of the ways Tugendhat’s objections against Heidegger’s interpretation of truth 
have been taken up and dealt with in the secondary literature.  As they bring to the 
fore some of the key elements of Tugendhat’s critique and the problems therein, I 
focus on the accounts put forth by Karl-Otto Apel, Cristina Lafont, Daniel 
Dahlstrom, and William Smith.80  I have selected these particular commentaries 
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because they bring to the fore Tugendhat’s main concerns with respect to 
Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as disclosedness.  Additionally, these 
contributions will help frame the discussion in my final chapter, where I 
problematise Tugendhat’s critique. 
§3 Tugendhat’s Critique 
Tugendhat enjoyed a privileged position from which to familiarise himself 
with the phenomenological tradition and, in particular, Heidegger’s contribution to 
this tradition.  He was Heidegger’s student.81  In 1967 he wrote his habilitation thesis 
on the concept of truth in Husserl and Heidegger.  In his paper “Heidegger’s Idea of 
Truth,” (1969) Tugendhat proposes that Heidegger’s determination of truth as 
disclosedness (alētheia) undermines what is essential to the usual concept of truth as 
correctness which allows us to speak of true statements as distinct from false ones.  
Accordingly, Tugendhat inquires into the significance of Heidegger’s interpretation 
of truth as disclosedness by assessing it in terms of the usual everyday concept of 
truth.  He also assesses the implications for critical questioning that follow from 
Heidegger’s concept of truth.  As already mentioned, Tugendhat claims that his 
critique is relevant to all Heidegger’s works that deal with truth.  According to his 
reading, in §44 Heidegger makes ‘decisions, which remain fundamental for 
everything that follows.’82  
Tugendhat notes that the significant features of Heidegger’s determination of 
truth as disclosedness emerge in the first two thirds of §44, where Heidegger argues 
for two theses: first, the truth of assertion means uncovering (discovering);83 second, 
truth in the most original sense means disclosedness.84  For the sake of clarity, I will 
follow Tugendhat’s division of his critique into two sections.  Tugendhat’s critique is 
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not straightforward.  Thus in order to avoid reducing it to a caricature, I unpack its 
main points in detail.   
§3.1 The Truth of Assertion as Being-Discovering  
§3.11 Agreement 
With respect to the first thesis, namely that the truth of assertion means 
uncovering, Tugendhat contends that despite Heidegger’s claim to discuss the usual 
concept of truth, he does not account for the agreement relation of statement with 
thing that is specific to truth.  As he explains, Heidegger’s understanding of truth as 
agreement, expressed in terms of the truth of assertion, is that a statement is ‘true 
when it shows the state of affairs “as it is in itself,” whereby the state of affairs is 
discovered to be “in itself just as it is pointed out in the assertion.”’85  To clarify, for 
Tugendhat, as he explains in Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Language, the agreement of statement with thing characteristic of 
correct propositions is a relation between the meaning of a statement and “reality.”86  
“Reality” for him is the “actual” state of affairs in which the thing is situated.  That 
is, statements cannot be about some isolated thing, but are necessarily about a state 
of affairs in terms of which the thing is.  To put it differently, a true judgment is that 
which “captures” this state of affairs just as it is itself.  This understanding needs to 
be kept in mind when we consider Tugendhat’s description of Heidegger’s account. 
Tugendhat takes the formulation of “just-as” in Heidegger’s definition of the 
truth of assertion to express the agreement relation.  However, Tugendhat also claims 
that in Heidegger’s account, there are two more determinations of the truth of 
assertion that are different but equivalent to the one outlined above (a statement is 
‘true when it shows the state of affairs “as it is in itself,” whereby the state of affairs 
is discovered to be “in itself just as it is pointed out in the assertion.”’)87  Tugendhat 
condenses and reinterprets Heidegger’s notion of the truth of assertion to three 
formulations.  He lays them out as follows: 
The assertion is true when it so indicates or discloses the state of affairs as it is in 
itself.88 
The assertion is true, means: it discloses the state of affairs in itself.89  
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The truthfulness (truth) of assertion must be understood as its disclosedness.90 
As Tugendhat interprets Heidegger, the main difference between these three 
“determinations of truth” turn on Heidegger’s use of the phrase “as it is in itself.”  It 
is important to note that it is Tugendhat who draws these three formulations from 
Heidegger’s text and proposes that they are equivalent definitions.  For Tugendhat, 
there is no problem with the first two formulations since both maintain the agreement 
relation between statement and a state of affairs.  As noted above, Tugendhat 
maintains that “agreement between the statement and the thing” is essential to the 
concept of truth.  According to Tugendhat’s interpretation, Heidegger explicitly 
accounts for agreement in the first formulation, and does so also in the second 
formulation even though, Tugendhat notes, he discards the qualifying “so-as.”91  
Tugendhat claims that despite discarding the just/so-as, Heidegger maintains the 
agreement relation by including the “in-itself,” which implicitly suggests agreement 
of the statement with the thing precisely as it is in-itself.92  That is, by Tugendhat’s 
account, in the second formulation he proposes, agreement is indicated implicitly 
inasmuch as the assertion is said to uncover the entity, specifically, in-itself.  
Nevertheless, the third and final formulation, as formulated by Tugendhat, is 
problematic.  There, allegedly Heidegger has altogether dropped any qualification 
that might indicate agreement between the statement and the thing, and therefore any 
reference to the manner of uncovering things that is specific to the true assertion.93  
According to Tugendhat, Heidegger gives no reasons for ‘this small, but yet decisive, 
step.’94 
Tugendhat speculates that the reason for Heidegger’s omission of the “as it is 
itself,” without further justification, is what he takes to be Heidegger’s commitment 
to a dynamic conception of assertion.  In Tugendhat’s words: 
As long as one understands the assertion statically, as a representation or meaning, one 
is, of course, not entitled to say: an assertion is true if and only if it means the entity in 
question; for the way in which it means the entity can also be false.  One is therefore 
already obliged to say: it is true if and only if it means the entity as it is itself.  If, on 
the other hand, we understand the assertion as a pointing out and an uncovering, it 
then seems to be sufficient if we say without further qualification: the assertion is true 
if it uncovers the entity, for, if it is false, it does not uncover the entity at all but 
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‘covers it up’ or ‘conceals’ it.  It therefore already lies in the nature of uncovering as 
such that it must be true if it really is an uncovering.95 
Thus Tugendhat’s claim is that Heidegger’s distinction between true and false 
assertion is in terms of whether or not the assertion “really,” or perhaps, genuinely, 
uncovers the thing.  Since a true assertion, supposedly, uncovers things in 
accordance with the nature of assertion as uncovering (as I explicate below), 
Tugendhat is claiming, Heidegger does not provide any justification or explanation 
for leaving out the qualifying “as it is itself” in what Tugendhat formulates as 
Heidegger’s final definition of the truth of assertion.  In other words, Tugendhat 
thinks that Heidegger understands the being-true of an assertion as genuineness.  
Heidegger eliminates the “in itself” in his definition of the truth of assertion, 
Tugendhat claims, on the grounds that in accordance with the structure of assertion 
(as pointing out, determining something in speech, making it manifest for others to 
see) any and every assertion is an uncovering of things.  Tugendhat objects to 
Heidegger’s use of uncovering, claiming it leads to important yet untenable 
consequences for the concept of truth.  
§3.12 Ambiguity, Uncovering, and Givenness 
According to Tugendhat, Heidegger’s definition of the truth of assertion relies 
on an ambiguous use of the word “uncovering,” leading to a failure to account for 
what is proper to the phenomenon of truth.  On the one hand, Heidegger accounts for 
the distinction between true and false statements in terms of whether the statement 
uncovers or covers over the state of affairs.  According to this account, the true 
statement uncovers while the false covers over.  Yet, on the other hand, in the light 
of Heidegger’s description of the structure of assertion as a pointing out and 
uncovering of things, every assertion, whether true or false, uncovers.  That is, in 
accord with Heidegger’s determination of the structure of statement, both true and 
false statements must be understood as uncovering.  This uncovering characteristic of 
statements generally is what Tugendhat refers to as uncovering in the “broad sense.”  
When Heidegger defines the truth of assertion as uncovering, Tugendhat 
claims, Heidegger conflates uncovering in the broad sense, which is proper to the 
structure of statements generally, with the “narrow sense” of uncovering proper to 
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the true assertion.96  Tugendhat contends that Heidegger never explicitly 
distinguishes between – what Tugendhat refers to as – the broad sense of uncovering 
(which includes both true and false assertion) and – what he refers to as – the narrow 
(and pregnant) sense of uncovering, which is reserved for true assertion alone.97  
Since both true and false assertions are both said to uncover something, Tugendhat 
argues, when defining truth we need to specify the manner of uncovering that allows 
us to distinguish between truth and falsity.98  Hence, Tugendhat’s problem is that 
Heidegger’s definition of the truth of assertion as uncovering fails to provide a 
criterion in terms of which we can differentiate true from false statements.  
In Tugendhat’s view, there is a particular manner of uncovering things and of 
the givenness of things, that must be specified in any adequate account of what truth 
means.  For Tugendhat, Heidegger neglects what is at stake in the specific sense of 
truth; namely, uncovering something specifically “as it is itself.”  This neglect, 
Tugendhat claims, is maintained in later works such as “On the Essence of Truth,” 
and “The Origin of the Work of Art.”   In these two papers, Tugendhat contends, as 
in Being and Time, Heidegger claims that the true statement shows things according 
to the manner in which we encounter them.99  In other words, true assertion lets 
something be seen just as it shows itself for us and is therefore only possible on the 
basis of things self-showing.  However, Tugendhat notes that ‘one simply cannot see 
that towards which the true assertion is directed as merely consisting in the self-
showing, in un-concealment as such.  For the false assertion is also directed towards 
something that shows itself.’100  That is, self-showing, unconcealment, is not 
sufficient to account for the idea of truth.  The thing must show as it is itself if we are 
to maintain that an assertion can be true.  
One might want to say that true assertion genuinely uncovers, whereas false 
assertion does not and is therefore not directed toward genuine self-showing.  
However, Tugendhat explains, inasmuch as true and false assertion alike are directed 
toward the self-showing of things, one has ‘to say that the true assertion is precisely 
not directed toward the entity as it manifests itself immediately but toward the entity 
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as it is itself.’101  Therefore, Tugendhat asserts, with Heidegger’s determination of 
the truth of assertion as uncovering, he abandons the distinction ‘within the self-
showing, between an immediate and, as it were, obtrusive givenness and [the 
givenness proper to] the thing itself.’102  This is untenable for Tugendhat insofar as it 
is precisely the givenness of the “thing itself” which corresponds with the manner of 
uncovering peculiar to the true assertion.  Heidegger’s abandonment of the 
distinction between the specific manner of givenness (of the thing itself) and 
givenness as such, Tugendhat claims, entails a renouncement of a sense of truth that 
is distinct from that of falsity.  
§3.2 The Most Original Sense of Truth as Disclosedness  
The second thesis Tugendhat examines is Heidegger’s claim that truth in the 
most original sense means disclosedness.  According to Tugendhat, Heidegger’s first 
thesis – namely, his definition of the truth of assertion as uncovering – provides the 
foundation for his extension of the concept of truth beyond the domain of assertion to 
any and every discovering of things in the world.103  Tugendhat contends that the 
concept of truth is extended even further, beyond things that our statements “reveal” 
to “discoveredness” as such.  The issue is thus that truth means “any and every 
discovering of things,” while also referring to “the disclosure of the world.”  The 
disclosure of the world – or, the horizon which is the prethematic disclosure of 
things, letting them show up as meaningful – is, according to Tugendhat, simply 
pronounced by Heidegger as ‘the ‘most original phenomenon of truth.’104  In short, 
from the definition of truth related to statements that allows us to uncover 
meaningful things, Heidegger – according to Tugendhat’s claim – extends the 
concept of truth beyond the domain of assertion to disclosedness, that is, to the 
horizon of meaning that defines how we encounter particular beings as meaningful. 
 What is problematic by Tugendhat’s account is that Heidegger establishes a 
definition of truth that passes over what is specific to truth (uncovering of things as 
they are themselves in our propositions), and then on the basis of this definition, 
carries the name “truth” over to the condition of possibility of uncovering as such, 
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which he terms uncovering in the broad sense.105   In Tugendhat’s words, ‘Heidegger 
holds on to the word truth but then deforms its meaning.’106  Once Heidegger 
concedes that the truth of assertion means uncovering, Tugendhat explains, 
‘everything else follows almost deductively.’107  According to this logic, since the 
truth of a statement lies in the uncovering of entities – our encountering them as 
meaningful enables us to make statements about them, revealing them as such by 
pointing them out – this uncovering is only possible on the basis of our prior 
discovering of entities.  Now, Tugendhat claims, it follows that any discovering of 
things in the world, any “encounter with them,” ‘is ‘true.’’108   
Yet Heidegger does not stop here, Tugendhat remarks, for what first makes the 
discovering and discoveredness of things in the world possible, is ‘the disclosure of 
Dasein as being-in-the-world, the disclosure of its world.’109  Yet for Tugendhat, 
inasmuch as Heidegger already understands truth in terms of uncovering and 
givenness generally, what now shows as the ‘most original truth,’ is the most basic 
unconcealment which makes discovering entities and speaking with others about 
them possible, that is, the disclosure of Dasein’s world, which is framed by the 
historical horizon.110  
Tugendhat refers to this original disclosure, or ‘opening up’ of the world, as 
‘the understanding of our historical horizon of meaning.’111  Tugendhat agrees with 
(what he thinks is) Heidegger’s notion of disclosedness as the “pregiven” meaning 
horizon of our encounters with things in the world.  As he sees it, Heidegger’s 
account of the truth of assertion as grounded in disclosedness adequately takes 
account of the “mediated” nature of our access to things themselves.112  In other 
words, the meaning of what things “really” are is unattainable to us since our access 
to the things as they are themselves is mediated by a historical meaning horizon. 
Hence, Tugendhat endorses Heidegger’s position on disclosedness as the horizon, the 
“there,” in which things show up as meaningful.  Yet, Tugendhat disagrees with the 
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definition of truth as disclosedness, which he interprets as Heidegger’s “equation” of 
disclosedness with truth.  
Since by Heidegger’s account, every true assertion is relative to a particular 
historical meaning horizon, Tugendhat insists that the crucial question with respect to 
the problem of truth comes to the fore.  He asks, ‘in what manner can one inquire 
into the truth of this horizon, or is it not rather the case that the question of truth can 
no longer be applied to the horizon itself?’113  Anticipating points I will expand upon 
in the following chapter, I will simply note here that it is one thing to ask about the 
condition of possibility for a meaningful disclosure of things within the “framework” 
of a historical horizon; it is altogether different to inquire into the “truth of the 
horizon.”  Tugendhat can only ask after the truth or falsity of the horizon only if he 
takes truth as disclosedness as equivalent to truth as correctness.  However, for 
Heidegger such a conception of truth as disclosedness is not possible.  The issue of 
the truth or falsity of the horizon is misguided and misleading, as I will show in the 
following chapter.  
Yet, Tugendhat suggests, this question regarding the “truth of the horizon” is 
closed off for Heidegger since he already understands the disclosure of world as ‘a 
truth in and for itself.’114  In other words, since the meaning horizon is already 
understood as a truth, any inquiry into the truth of the horizon is rendered 
superfluous inasmuch as it becomes an inquiry ‘into the truth of a truth.’115 
Tugendhat claims that it makes sense to inquire into the truth of a meaning, or 
of an assertion, but not of a truth.  By Tugendhat’s account, to inquire into the truth 
of an assertion means to pursue verification that the assertion ‘correctly 
comprehends’ the in-itself of that which it points out.116  To inquire into the “truth” 
of meaning, or what Tugendhat also conceives of as the “in-itself” of meaning, 
means to pursue clarification.  In terms of the pursuit of clarification of meaning, ‘the 
in itself of truth, the ‘as it is itself,” Tugendhat claims, ‘is only a regulative idea of 
the process of critical questioning.’117  For the “truth” of meaning, Tugendhat 
explains, is characterised by evidence and certainty.  It ‘emerges in the evidence of 
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complete transparency,’ yet as finite historical beings, such truth is beyond our 
reach.118  
For Tugendhat, inasmuch as Heidegger interprets truth as disclosedness, the 
import of his insight into our mediated access to things as they “really” are is left by 
the wayside in preference of a notion of the true meaning of things as something 
“immediately given” and into which we have “direct” access.119  As far as Tugendhat 
is concerned, no such access is possible.  Here emerges a difference, which I touched 
upon in chapter one and shall return to in chapter three, between Heidegger and 
Tugendhat with respect to their conception of the relation between appearances, 
phenomena (what shows), and the things themselves.  For in opposition to 
Heidegger, Tugendhat aligns appearances and phenomena, separating phenomena 
from the things themselves.  It is on the basis of this separation that Tugendhat speak 
of “mediated” access. 
From his different approach to phenomena and things themselves, we can 
understand Tugendhat’s claim that there is no in-itself of meaning that we can go to 
and check our interpretations against.  However for Tugendhat, that we have no 
access to “true meaning” does not entail the superfluity of the critical enterprise.  In 
his view, we can posit the in-itself of meaning, that is, “the truth,” as a regulative 
idea and as an objective ground in terms of which we can all measure our 
understandings in our struggle for clarity.  By Tugendhat’s account, a conception of 
truth as a regulative idea of self-evidence and certainty supposedly maintains 
Heidegger’s insight regarding our access to the true meaning of things as mediated 
by a historical horizon of meaning.120  At the same time, Tugendhat contends that the 
conception of truth, as a regulative idea, additionally allows for the possibility of 
critical engagement with interpretations shared by others, spanning different finite 
cultural and historical situations.  Tugendhat thinks that this allows for critical 
engagement at both the level of disclosedness (critical engagement with our 
historical meaning horizon) and at the level of assertion (for example, critically 
engaging with the Heidegger’s account of truth).  
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 From this perspective, Tugendhat objects, Heidegger’s determination of truth 
as disclosedness means that ‘an understanding of world in general is opened up but 
not that it is put to the test.’121  That is, if we accept Heidegger’s own determination 
of truth as disclosedness, as Tugendhat interprets it, then his entire account becomes 
immune from critique because any and every disclosure is true.  Given his 
interpretation of Heidegger’s account of assertion as disclosure, he believes that 
Heidegger also “discloses” his interpretation of the world.  Consequently, insofar as 
all disclosure is true, as Tugendhat takes Heidegger to be saying, Heidegger’s 
account must be true.  Therefore, Tugendhat argues, because Heidegger abandons the 
“in itself” of truth by “equating” truth with disclosedness, he lets go of the notion of 
truth as a regulative idea.  Hence, in Tugendhat’s view, Heidegger forgoes the 
possibility of critical engagement with one’s own understanding of the surrounding 
world and that of others.122  
To sum up my previous discussion, Tugendhat finds Heidegger’s definition of 
the truth of assertion problematic inasmuch as it leaves us with no means for 
distinguishing what we would normally take to be true assertions from false ones; 
effectively doing away with the agreement relation between statements and things 
and the principle of non-contradiction (that a statement is either true or false).  
Tugendhat claims that defining the truth of assertion as uncovering and foregoing the 
concept of truth in the specific sense, that is, as opposed to falsity, enables Heidegger 
to extend the concept of truth beyond the domain of assertion to disclosedness.  This 
extension is untenable for Tugendhat.  In his view, as already noted, it is precisely 
because our access to things themselves is mediated, that absolute evidence and truth 
as certainty are unattainable for finite historical human beings.  On his account, 
evidence, certainty and truth must remain only “regulative ideas” that will guide us 
in the process of critical questioning.123  Since Heidegger equates truth with 
disclosedness, Tugendhat claims, Heidegger also gives up the possibility of critical 
questioning.  
For the remainder of this chapter I examine some ways Tugendhat’s criticisms 
have been taken up in the secondary literature.  I focus on the particular 
interpretations put forth by Apel and Lafont in support of Tugendhat’s critique and 
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those put forth by Dahlstrom and Smith in defence of Heidegger.  Doing so will 
allow for a richer account of what is at stake in Tugendhat’s disagreement with 
Heidegger, and will lay the ground for my discussion and a possible Heideggerian 
response (that differs from Dahlstrom’s and Smith’s) in the third chapter.  To enable 
me to formulate a different response to Tugendhat’s critique, I will discuss the 
secondary literature that deals with this problem. 
§4 Responses to Tugendhat: Apel, Lafont, Dahlstrom, and Smith  
Apel supports Tugendhat’s critique in his paper “Regulative Ideas or Truth-
Happening?: An Attempt to Answer the Question of the Conditions of the Possibility 
of Valid Understanding.”124  In his paper, Apel interprets Heidegger’s determination 
of truth as alētheia in terms of a rejection and replacement of the concept of truth as 
correctness.125  Similar to Tugendhat, he argues that by defining truth as alētheia, 
Heidegger gives an account of truth that fails to provide a criterion for distinguishing 
correctness from incorrectness.  Apel contends that contrary to Heidegger’s account 
of truth, alētheia, as the historical event of the disclosure of Being is not the only 
determining standard with respect to correctness.126  As Apel is primarily concerned 
with securing a foundation for knowledge, or as he otherwise puts it, the progress of 
understanding, such an abandonment of truth in the sense of correctness and its 
replacement by truth as alētheia is problematic.  
In Apel’s view, Heidegger’s determination of truth as alētheia renders any talk 
about the “progress” of understanding meaningless.  While Apel accepts that as finite 
historically situated human beings we make sense of our surrounding world in terms 
of our particular historical context, it is precisely our historical-situatedness that 
demands a time-independent criterion in terms of which we can distinguish correct 
from incorrect “understandings.”127  For Apel, it is not enough to merely note that 
there different understanding.  He wants to be able to evaluate understandings and 
designate some as better than others.  Supposedly, only with an absolute and 
universally binding criterion can we have an objective ground in terms of which we 
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can critically engage with our own historically contingent interpretations as well as 
those of others.  Insofar as truth is taken to mean alētheia, for Apel, we are left 
without such an objective, justificatory ground, leading to relativism.  
It is Apel’s contention that Heidegger “corrects” himself in a lecture, “The End 
of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” he delivered only months after Tugendhat 
first voiced his critique in 1964.128  Heidegger’s correction, Apel contends, takes the 
form of a retreat from the position he had been committed to since Being and Time; 
namely, that truth in the most original sense means alētheia. I quote at length 
Heidegger’s passage that Apel refers to: 
Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional “natural” sense as the correspondence 
of knowledge with beings demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is 
interpreted as the certainty of the knowledge of Being, alētheia, unconcealment in the 
sense of the opening may not be equated with truth.  Rather, alētheia, unconcealment 
thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth.  For truth itself, just as Being 
and thinking, can only be what it is in the element of the opening.  Evidence, certainty 
in every degree, every kind of verification of veritas already move with that veritas in 
the realm of the prevalent opening.  Alētheia, unconcealment thought as the opening 
of presence, is not yet truth.129  
According to Apel’s interpretation, Heidegger here acknowledges the necessity of a 
determining standard other than alētheia and, in turn, the inadequacy of an 
interpretation of truth construed merely as alētheia.130  A few lines down, Apel 
claims, Heidegger is explicitly critical of the position he has held since Being and 
Time.  To support his claim, he cites Heidegger: ‘[t]o raise the question of alētheia, 
of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth. For this 
reason, it was inadequate and misleading to call alētheia in the sense of opening, 
truth.’131  
Lafont, in reference to the same passage from “The End of Philosophy and the 
Task of Thinking,” also makes this point in her book Heidegger, Language, and 
World-Disclosure.132  She claims that in this passage, Heidegger concedes that 
alētheia is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of truth as correctness.133  
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Lafont too interprets Heidegger as retreating from the account of truth under fire 
from Tugendhat, going as far as to attribute ‘the motive force behind Heidegger’s 
retreat’ to Heidegger’s alleged appreciation of Tugendhat’s critique.134 
Rather than focusing his attention around Heidegger’s supposed retraction, 
Dahlstrom returns to Being and Time, §44.  Contrary to Tugendhat, Apel and Lafont, 
in his book Heidegger’s Concept of Truth, Dahlstrom argues that Heidegger’s 
interpretation of truth as alētheia entails no abandonment of truth as correctness.  
Furthermore, he defends Heidegger against Apel’s claim (essentially Tugendhat’s 
too) that a definition of truth as alētheia results in the impossibility of critical 
engagement with others.  For Dahlstrom, Heidegger articulates his interpretation of 
truth as alētheia by providing reasons expressed in statements and thus attempts to 
argue for the truth of these statements.  In this way, Dahlstrom claims that Heidegger 
bears a commitment to the bivalence of assertions.  According to this interpretation, 
the principle of contradiction, according to which a statement is either true or false, is 
affirmed by Heidegger.135  
For Dahlstrom moreover, Heidegger cannot give up truth as correctness 
because of the transcendental character of his investigation.136  That is, truth as 
correctness is precisely that for which Heidegger is seeking transcendental grounds.  
It would make no sense to offer grounding for something one intends to abandon. 
The truth of assertion presupposes, as its condition of possibility, the most original 
phenomenon of truth, as alētheia.  Yet, Dahlstrom explains, Heidegger’s arrival at, 
and articulation of, truth in the sense of alētheia presupposes truth in the sense of 
correctness of statements.137  For Dahlstrom, these two senses of truth are 
“equiprimordial” insofar as they presuppose one another.138  From the perspective of 
Heidegger’s commitment to the equiprimordiality of the truth of statements and truth 
as alētheia, Tugendhat’s claim, that Heidegger sacrifices truth as correctness with his 
definition of truth as alētheia appears unfounded.  
However, in his paper "Why Tugendhat's Critique of Heidegger's Concept of 
Truth Remains a Critical Problem," Smith criticises Dahlstrom’s defence of 
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Heidegger (primarily, Dahlstrom’s defence against the charge that Heidegger’s 
account of truth as alētheia renders the concept of truth as correctness redundant).  
For Smith, Dahlstrom’s defence is an inadequate response to Tugendhat’s critique, 
and commonplace amongst defenders of Heidegger.139  Smith draws upon Lafont’s 
formulation of the “standard response” made by Heideggerian scholars against 
Tugendhat.  Smith and Lafont claim that this common Heideggerian response has 
two parts.  
First, they suggest that according to Heideggerians, Tugendhat’s commitment 
to an understanding of truth conceived strictly in terms of correctness is dogmatic.140  
In contrast to this dogmatism, Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as alētheia is not 
meant to replace truth as correctness; rather, there are two distinct senses of truth at 
play in Heidegger’s account of truth.141  
The second part of the common response to Tugendhat is to point out that the 
more primordial phenomenon of truth, truth as alētheia, is the basis that in the first 
place makes truth as correctness possible.142  However, both Lafont and Smith 
suggest that this response does not sufficiently answer Tugendhat’s criticism.  
Merely pointing out that Heidegger retains the concept of truth as correctness while 
grounding it in a more primordial sense of truth does not address the central aspect of 
Tugendhat’s objections.143  Smith claims that a response such as Dahlstrom’s fails to 
address Tugendhat’s central objection; namely, Heidegger’s definition of truth as 
alētheia does not maintain the critical dimension specific to our usual understanding 
of truth as truth in opposition to falsity.144  As we already noted, from Tugendhat’s 
perspective, an adequate account of truth must provide a criterion in terms of which 
we can distinguish truth from falsity.  Inasmuch as Heidegger’s definition fails to 
provide this criterion, Smith stresses what he considers to be Tugendhat’s crucial 
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question: ‘with what right and what meaning Heidegger chooses the word ‘truth’’ to 
characterise alētheia?145  
Dahlstrom is aware of the question Tugendhat raises and to which Lafont and 
Smith appeal.  Indeed, Dahlstrom notes that by Tugendhat’s account, the idea that 
alētheia is a ‘type of truth’ does not necessarily follow from the fact that alētheia is 
the condition of possibility of true assertion.146  As Dahlstrom explains, there must 
be ‘something further’ that warrants Heidegger’s determination of alētheia ‘as the 
original truth.’147  
First, Dahlstrom claims that Heidegger is justified in speaking of alētheia ‘as a 
‘truth’ because…[Dasein] discloses itself and, indeed, as it is in itself.’148  Alētheia is 
that which makes possible any standard for showing in terms of which we might 
speak of something manifesting or of a statement showing things as they are in their 
uncoveredness.  Dahlstrom explains, ‘[a]s its original and authentic horizon, being-
here’s future is disclosed to it or, better, being-here discloses its future to itself with 
existential certainty (Gewißheit) that conscience (Gewissen) alone can convey.’149  
Second, Heidegger’s designation of this truth as the ‘most original’ is legitimate, 
Dahlstrom claims, since as ‘the horizon for every other “truth,”’ it is ‘presupposed by 
(posited with) every other truth.’150  That is, by Dahlstrom’s account, the horizon is 
the most original truth insofar as it makes possible and co-constitutes the discovering 
of entities and the possibility of making true assertions about them.  
However, I suggest that this explanation is problematic insofar as Dahlstrom is 
appealing to Heidegger’s notion of authentic disclosure in order to justify 
Heidegger’s determination of truth as alētheia.  This is important to note insofar as 
the condition of possibility of our discovering things and making statements about 
them is not, by Heidegger’s account, the “authentic disclosure of existence” or as 
Dahlstrom elsewhere refers to it, the “truth of existence,” but rather it is alētheia as 
such. 
Moreover, Dahlstrom argues, truth as alētheia is necessary inasmuch as 
alētheia is presupposed as the condition of possibility for making or questioning 
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claims.  Asking whether alētheia is true or false is meaningless, according to 
Dahlstrom’s interpretation, since any rejection of alētheia takes its stand on the basis 
of alētheia and is therefore self-contradictory.151  In other words, Dahlstrom argues 
for the immunity of alētheia from rational doubt on the grounds that the idea of 
alētheia being false is itself dependent on truth as alētheia.  Although we cannot 
meaningfully question the horizon with respect to its truth or falsity, it does not 
necessarily follow, according to Dahlstrom, that the question of truth cannot be 
raised with regard to statements.152  It is significant to note that it seems as though 
Dahlstrom does not address the problematic notion of the “truth of the horizon” that I 
touched upon above in my exposition of Tugendhat’s critique and to which we will 
return in the following chapter.  As noted, Dahlstrom claims, Heidegger adheres to 
the principle of bivalence in his articulation of his interpretation of truth as alētheia.  
Therefore, Dahlstrom argues, Heidegger maintains the possibility of critique at the 
level of assertion.  Thus Heidegger’s position is not closed off to the possibility of 
critical engagement with particular interpretations of particular states of affairs. 
If we recall Dahlstrom’s earlier point with respect to the equiprimordiality of 
truth as correctness and truth as alētheia, the fact that Heidegger justifies speaking of 
truth as alētheia by appealing to its primordial character is problematic.  By 
Dahlstrom’s interpretation, alētheia is not open to question with respect to being true 
or false precisely because it is the condition that first grants the possibility of 
correctness.  Nonetheless, inasmuch as alētheia and correctness presuppose each 
other and are in this sense equiprimordial, Dahlstrom claims that Heidegger gives us 
no means for distinguishing the “authentic truth of existence” from other derivative 
truths, and from this perspective, he argues, Heidegger is left open to Tugendhat’s 
critique regarding the impossibility of critical engagement with one’s own 
understanding.153  However, as noted above, it is important to point out that this is a 
problematic reading of Heidegger insofar as the “authentic truth of existence” is not 
the alētheia that Heidegger designates as the “most original phenomenon of truth” 
and on which all particular truths are grounded. 
Smith in turn, responds to Dahlstrom’s attempt to justify Heidegger’s notion of 
truth as alētheia (disclosedness) by showing ‘that disclosedness can be understood as 
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the “original truth,” a sense of truth distinct from and presupposed by’ correctness.154  
Smith thinks that Dahlstrom fails in this attempt.  As Smith writes, ‘Dahlstrom never 
describes how disclosedness itself can be understood and justified as truth in a sense 
distinct from correctness.’155  Smith argues that Dahlstrom merely appropriates the 
criterion for truth as correctness, that is, the uncovering and showing of something 
just as it is itself, and applies it to Heidegger’s notion of alētheia.  From Smith’s 
perspective, such a response to Tugendhat is inadequate, because: 
…if Dahlstrom intends to call disclosedness the ‘original truth’ based on the criteria 
specified by correctness, then he undercuts his own reply to Tugendhat…we have not 
really been supplied with some new sense of truth after all: rather, what we encounter 
is a curious extension of the norms of propositional truth into the very phenomenon 
that was supposed to ground it.156 
That is, despite Dahlstrom thinking otherwise, he is really only speaking of one sense 
of truth but attributing it to both correctness and alētheia.  It is significant to note that 
Tugendhat, in a way, also makes this move, that is, and as I will further explicate in 
the next chapter, he subsumes alētheia under correctness.  As already mentioned, 
Tugendhat claims that Heidegger’s definition of truth as alētheia leaves us with no 
means for distinguishing true from false statements.  An adequate response, from 
Smith’s perspective, must therefore account for the manner in which Heidegger’s 
notion of truth as alētheia provides a criterion for distinguishing truth from falsity.  
Having shown Smith’s dissatisfaction with Dahlstrom’s defence of Heidegger, 
I will now turn to the Heideggerian defence Smith himself offers.  In response to the 
problem Tugendhat raises with respect to Heidegger’s determination of truth as 
alētheia as an unjustified deformation of the meaning of truth, Smith claims to show 
the manner in which Heidegger maintains the specifically critical dimension of truth 
with his notion of truth as alētheia.  According to Smith, Heidegger does not deform 
the concept of truth.  Additionally, Smith contends that even from the notion of truth 
as alētheia we are still able to draw out a specific sense of truth as distinct from 
falsity.  Smith wants to show that Heidegger’s determination of truth as alētheia (that 
is, disclosedness) maintains the critical dimension, specific to the phenomenon of 
truth; that is, Heidegger’s definition of truth provides a criterion in terms of which 
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we can distinguish “true disclosedness” from “false disclosedness.”157  Although not 
explicitly articulated by Heidegger, Smith believes such a criterion can be found in 
Heidegger’s concept of resoluteness.  In Smith’s words: 
It is only as resolute that Dasein can make the modes of authenticity and inauthenticity 
normative for itself in a critical sense.  That is, it is only through resoluteness that 
Dasein binds itself to authenticity, and through this self-transparency about 
breakdown, resolves to work out the inconsistencies in its skills and standards in light 
of the things themselves…resoluteness is not only, as Heidegger calls it, the 
‘‘primordial truth of existence’’: it is the normative fulcrum of truth as disclosedness 
as well.158 
In other words, Smith argues that Heidegger’s notion of resoluteness accounts for the 
criterion in terms of which we can distinguish correct (authentic) from incorrect 
(inauthentic) alētheia.159  Therefore, he claims, Heidegger is justified in speaking of 
alētheia as a sense of truth distinct from and presupposed by truth as correctness only 
to the extent that Dasein is understood as resolute.160  However, this way of 
responding to Tugendhat’s critique is problematic from a Heideggerian perspective 
inasmuch as it entails the subordination of alētheia to correctness, which is ironically 
the very point Smith makes with regard to the inadequacy of Dahlstrom’s account of 
the meaning of alētheia as the most original phenomenon of truth. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explained Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of 
truth as presented in “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth.”  In order to suggest a possible 
response to Tugendhat’s objections, it was first necessary to be clear about what 
those objections entailed.  
Firstly, I elucidated Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s conception of truth as 
alētheia.  Having clarified Tugendhat’s account, I turned my attention to some of the 
ways Tugendhat’s objections against Heidegger’s account of truth have been taken 
up and dealt with in the secondary literature.  In particular, I focused on the accounts 
put forth by Apel, Lafont, Dahlstrom, and Smith.  These accounts have extended and 
complicated my discussion.  Firstly, they have shown several ways in which one can 
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respond to Tugendhat and the limitations of such responses.  I suggest that, in part at 
least, some of the objections made to Heidegger from Tugendhat and his followers, 
as well as certain aspects of those intervening in the debate to defend Heidegger, are 
in fact based on a misreading of Heidegger’s account of truth.  Moreover, as I 
stressed in chapter one, they do not always account for the broader philosophical 
framework or phenomenological-hermeneutic approach employed by Heidegger. 
Nevertheless, it was necessary to consider this literature to bring to the fore the 
main points of contention between Heidegger and Tugendhat, thus allowing me the 
possibility to address what I consider to be the main points of contention, namely, (1) 
whether by defining truth as alētheia, Heidegger discards the agreement relation of 
statement with thing, (2) the connection of certainty and evidence with truth, thereby 
abandoning the usual concept of truth as correctness, and (3) forgoing the possibility 
of engaging in critical questioning. 
I now turn to this task in the third and final chapter, in which I propose a 
possible response to Tugendhat’s critique and an inquiry into the presuppositions of 
Tugendhat’s criticisms.  This allows me to make clear my general claim that 
Tugendhat relies on certain presuppositions in his critique of Heidegger that 
Heidegger would not accept. 
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A Possible Heideggerian Response 
In the previous chapter, I outlined Tugendhat’s criticisms and examined 
different ways the criticisms have been taken up and dealt in a selection of the 
secondary literature to.  I focused on the particular interpretations put forth by Apel 
and Lafont in support of Tugendhat’s critique and those put forth by Dahlstrom and 
Smith in defence of Heidegger.  Now, after laying out the details of these 
commentaries, in this third and final chapter, I will attempt to show that the 
responses put forth by Dahlstrom and Smith are inadequate.  Despite attempting to 
defend Heidegger, I argue that they do not do so on Heidegger’s own terms.  I will 
draw upon a number of Heidegger’s works to show why this is the case, and sketch a 
more likely Heideggerian response to Tugendhat’s criticisms.  
I devote the final section of this chapter to a consideration of the different, and 
incompatible, methodological starting points taken up by Heidegger and Tugendhat.  
I show that Tugendhat’s critique is derived from his commitment to the very 
presuppositions that Heidegger is trying to call into question through his inquiry into 
the meaning of truth.  From this vantage point we can also make sense of 
Heidegger’s supposed retractions regarding his early concept of truth.  Contrary to 
the view of both Apel and Lafont, I suggest that this supposed retraction could be 
read differently.  That is, Heidegger’s remarks regarding his earlier account is not to 
be taken as a disavowal but as a recognition of the difficulty of the challenge that 
Heidegger sets before his readers to rethink the concept of truth. 
§5 A Heideggerian Response to Tugendhat’s Critique 
As noted above and as hinted at in the previous chapter, I suggest that both 
Smith and Dahlstrom defend Heidegger on terms that Heidegger himself would not 
accept.  In the following section I show why this is the case and sketch a way we can 
respond to Tugendhat’s criticisms without compromising Heidegger’s project.  First, 
I will outline some of the problems with Smith’s and Dahlstrom’s defences of 
Heidegger. 
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§5.1 On the Meaning of Truth as Alētheia 
For Smith, Heidegger is justified in speaking of truth as alētheia only insofar 
as alētheia is understood in terms of the authentic disclosure to which resolute 
Dasein binds itself.  However, Smith’s interpretation of resoluteness as the criterion 
in terms of which we can distinguish correct (authentic) from incorrect (inauthentic) 
alētheia rests on the unquestioned assumption that we can subject alētheia to critical 
evaluation in terms of correctness and incorrectness.  As already noted, Smith’s 
response to Tugendhat ultimately rests on the subordination of truth as alētheia to 
truth as correctness.  Such a response does not do justice to Heidegger’s standpoint, 
since for Heidegger an understanding of truth strictly in terms of correctness 
overlooks the original essence of truth.161  As Heidegger writes in Contributions to 
Philosophy (Of the Event), ‘“correctness” is a “species” of truth which falls short of 
the originary essence, since it is a consequence of that essence and therefore already 
is not enough for grasping the original truth.’162  In other words, and as we saw in 
chapter one, truth as correctness is grounded in the most original phenomenon of 
truth, where the essence of truth is understood not as adaequatio but rather as 
alētheia.  Thus Smith’s defence actually abandons the very distinction Heidegger’s 
account upholds between particular truths (something being-true, knowledge or a 
statement) and the essence of truth. 
§5.11 The Essence of Truth as Truth in the Most Original Sense 
We can see further problems with both Smith’s and Dahlstrom’s accounts by 
considering Heidegger’s comments on the relationship between truth and essence.  
What Heidegger means by “originary essence” can be clarified in light of the 
distinction he makes in “The Origin of the Work of Art” between the inessential 
sense of essence on the one hand, and the essential sense on the other.  According to 
the ordinary concept of essence, Heidegger claims, essence is understood in the sense 
of ‘generic and universal concepts which represent the one that holds indifferently 
for the many.’163  This in-different essence is, in Heidegger’s view, the inessential 
essence.  By contrast, the originary essential essence lies ‘in that which a being, in 
truth, is.  The true essence of something is determined by its true being, by the truth 
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of each being.’164  Here Heidegger notes, ‘[a] curious entanglement reveals itself.’165  
That is, the question of the essence of truth leads back to the question of the truth of 
essence.  
In his paper, “On the Essence of Truth,” Heidegger addresses the essential 
belonging together of truth and essence.  He claims to demonstrate that the question 
of the essence of truth leads back to the question of the truth of essence.166  Here too 
Heidegger distinguishes between the essence of truth in the sense of the usual 
concept of essence from the essence of truth in the most original, essential sense.167  
Yet, he offers further details concerning this entanglement.  He claims that ‘[t]he 
question of the essence of truth finds its answer in the proposition the essence of 
truth is the truth of essence.’168  He clarifies the meaning of “essence” in the first part 
of his claim, which speaks of the essence of truth, where essence should be 
understood ‘in the sense of whatness (quidditas) or material content (realitas).’169  
Put differently, the essence of truth in this case ‘is understood as a characteristic of 
knowledge.’170  In other words, truth in this sense is particular, related to the 
propositional character of truth of statements that correspond with the “whatness” of 
a thing.  That is, truth is here understood in the sense of being-true.  
With respect to the second part of his claim regarding the truth of essence, 
Heidegger explains that in this formulation, essence is understood as Being, and 
‘[t]ruth signifies sheltering that clears [lichtendes Bergen] as the fundamental trait of 
Being.’171  To put it differently, here he speaks of the “beingness” of truth, what 
makes truth to be truth.  So, in the first formulation we have the essence of truth, 
which is the being-true of particular statements, established by agreement of 
statements with the “whatness” of things.  With respect to the truth of essence, which 
the question of the essence of truth leads back to, truth is conceived of as what in 
Heidegger’s discussion in Being and Time is the opening, the clearing, that is, the 
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disclosedness, which Dasein as being-in-the-world is.  ‘The name of this clearing 
[Lichtung],’ he explains, ‘is ἀλήθεια.’172  
Thus with respect to the notion that the essence of truth is the truth of essence, 
Heidegger writes, ‘[s]heltering that clears is – i.e., lets essentially unfold – 
accordance between knowledge and beings.’173  It is important to note that Heidegger 
is not equating alētheia and agreement, rather the “is” used above is explained 
further as an “is,” which is not static but ‘lets [meaningful things] essentially unfold,’ 
that is, it is related to what Heidegger also calls the historical horizon that allows 
beings to unfold and show themselves.  Put differently, the essence of truth is the 
clearing, the “there,” which is grounded in our being-in-the-world and which first 
grants the possibility of things showing up as meaningful, and thus allowing us to 
make particular statements about them.  
In short, speaking of truth as alētheia does not entail sacrificing truth in the 
sense of correctness but shows that correctness rests on something else than mere 
agreement between a statement and a state of affairs.  For Heidegger, truth as 
alētheia refers to the essence of truth and reveals to us something about the truth of 
essence.  The Being of truth lets particular truths be what they are, corresponding to 
the “whatness” of things.  For Heidegger, the essence of truth is not an indifferent 
criterion to which all particular truths adhere.  That is, essence is not meant as an 
essential feature or abstract generality; rather, essence comes to the fore as an 
unceasing struggle of presencing with absencing, in which ‘historical human beings’ 
and their understanding unfolds.174  
Heidegger’s account of truth as alētheia as the essence of truth is not captured 
in Smith’s defence of Heidegger.  For in his attempt to account for Heidegger’s 
determination of truth as alētheia, Smith construes alētheia as a particular truth, that 
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is, as something that is true (as authentic) rather than the essence of truth.  However, 
as I have just discussed, alētheia as the essence of truth cannot itself be a particular 
truth.  From Heidegger’s perspective, such an understanding of alētheia as a 
particular truth ignores alētheia as the essence of truth, that is, the clearing that first 
grants the possibility of agreement of statement with thing characteristic of 
correctness. 
Similarly, Dahlstrom also comes dangerously close to using a conception of 
truth as certainty in order to assess truth as alētheia as certainty.  Dahlstrom does not 
think alētheia can be subject to critical evaluation.  In this respect, his position 
differs from Smith’s.  For as I showed in chapter two, Dahlstrom argues that we 
cannot meaningfully question whether alētheia is true or false insofar as alētheia is 
presupposed in the very act of posing questions.  However, upon closer inspection, 
we see that Dahlstrom also construes alētheia as a particular truth, as something that 
is true.  Dahlstrom defends the legitimacy of truth as alētheia on the grounds that any 
inquiry into the “truth of alētheia” is self-contradictory, since entertaining the 
possibility of alētheia being fails to take into consideration the very ground upon 
which such a question would be based.175  In other words, Dahlstrom argues, alētheia 
is indubitable, that is, immune from rational doubt.  Dahlstrom is here arguing that 
Heidegger is justified in speaking of truth as alētheia, that is, by providing reasons 
for why alētheia is certain.  However, taking alētheia to be true because doubting its 
truth entails self-contradiction, risks reducing truth as alētheia to something that can 
be expressed in propositional form.  That is, as a particular truth.  Thus, like Smith he 
makes a defence of truth as alētheia that risks collapsing the distinction at the heart 
of Heidegger’s account of truth.  Heidegger would agree that it does not make sense 
to question the “truth of the horizon” but not because it entails a self-contradiction.  
To reiterate, Smith and Dahlstrom construe truth in the sense of alētheia as a 
particular truth, as something that is true.  In his attempt to justify Heidegger’s 
determination of truth as alētheia, Smith thinks truth merely in the sense of 
correctness.  Dahlstrom’s account of why Heidegger is justified in speaking of truth 
as alētheia is misguided insofar as it could be suggested that he assesses alētheia in 
terms of truth as certainty by appealing to non-contradiction.  Both render alētheia as 
a particular truth and not the ground and essence of any and every particular truth.  
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Hence, I suggest, these defences of Heidegger are not in accord with Heidegger’s 
reasons for exploring the concept of truth in the first place. 
§5.2 On the Problem of Critical Questioning 
By analysing Smith’s and Dahlstrom’s defences of Heidegger, we come to see 
that Tugendhat’s question regarding the manner in which, if at all, we can inquire 
into the “truth of alētheia,” is misguided (and misleading).  In other words, 
Dahlstrom and Smith accept Tugendhat’s challenge and attempt to show (in Smith’s 
case) that the truth of the horizon of meaning can be true and (in Dahlstrom’s case) 
that alētheia is itself true.  As noted in chapter two, Tugendhat understands 
Heidegger’s account of truth as alētheia in terms of alētheia being-true.  In other 
words, only particular truths can be affirmed or denied.  It is on the basis of such a 
presupposition that Tugendhat raises the question as to whether and how we can 
inquire into the “truth of alētheia.”  As we also saw in chapter two, the claim that 
alētheia is immune from critique is the basis for Tugendhat’s criticism of Heidegger; 
namely, that Heidegger’s determination of truth as alētheia lets go of the possibility 
of critical engagement altogether.  For Tugendhat, as it was also shown in chapter 
two, it is only by positing truth as a regulative idea that we maintain the possibility of 
critical questioning.  
Smith and Dahlstrom accept Tugendhat’s assertion that the possibility of 
critical questioning in Heidegger depends upon whether or not alētheia can be true or 
false.  For Dahlstrom, the fact that the notion of alētheia cannot be questioned means 
that Heidegger fails, at the level of alētheia, to provide a means for critical 
engagement with our own understanding.  Smith, on the other hand, argues that the 
critical function of truth remains at play in Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as 
alētheia on the basis of the supposition that we can legitimately subject alētheia to 
critical evaluation in terms of correctness and incorrectness via the concept of 
resoluteness.  
§5.21 Heidegger’s Critical Standpoint: Hermeneutics and Phenomenology 
However, as Jeff Malpas points out in his paper “The Twofold Character of 
Truth: Heidegger, Davidson, Tugendhat,” it does not follow from the fact that 
Heidegger’s account excludes the evaluation of alētheia in terms of correctness and 
incorrectness that Heidegger’s position excludes the possibility of critical 
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questioning altogether.176  As discussed in chapter one, Heidegger approaches 
philosophical problems in a specifically hermeneutic (interpretive) fashion.  Malpas 
also emphasises the hermeneutic character of Heidegger’s thought.  As Malpas 
underlines, hermeneutic inquiry is interpretive.  It does not rest content with what 
immediately and initially shows, but looks beyond and asks after the broader horizon 
in terms of which things manifest as they do.177  We saw Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
questioning at play in chapter one when I considered his inquiry into the possibility 
of truth as correctness, highlighting its origin as alētheia.  Thus it is important to 
keep in mind that Heidegger’s account of truth is framed by his hermeneutic 
approach.  
As Malpas observes, ‘[t]he idea of truth as unconcealment is not an idea 
arrived at merely by some sort of unquestioned revelation, but arises out of an 
original questioning of the possibility of truth as correctness.’178  With respect to 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic questioning, Malpas explains:  
…an essential circularity [is] at work here, since it is only through the immediacy of 
the presentation that the larger framework becomes at all evident (for the most part it 
remains withdrawn) at the same time as the presentation is itself dependent on that 
larger framework – a circularity that, in traditional hermeneutics, is understood in 
terms of the mutual dependence of whole and part.179 
Hermeneutic inquiry is founded upon this insight into the circularity of 
understanding.  Understanding is never complete, but always partial.  It is on the 
basis of this founding insight into understanding as circular and incomplete that 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics can be considered to take a critical stance.  As Ingo Farin 
explains in his paper, “Heidegger: Transformation of Hermeneutics”: 
Heidegger’s hermeneutical stance is critical.  It has nothing to do with the submission 
to anonymous forces of history, or the blind advocacy of relativism.  The task of 
understanding one’s own current philosophical hermeneutical situation comes with the 
critical insight that one cannot transcend one’s historical situation.180 
Since we can only understand the particular in terms of the whole and the whole in 
terms of the particular, we must be content with oscillating back and forth between 
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part and whole.  As Heidegger writes in “On the Essence of Truth,”  ‘[p]hilosophical 
thinking is gentle releasement that does not renounce the concealment of beings as a 
whole [Being].’181  In other words, our understanding is always partial, framed by 
alētheia, by the historical horizon.  
In contrast to Tugendhat’s claim and those who endorse his position, 
Heidegger’s philosophy is fundamentally critically engaged.  For a start, Heidegger 
invites critical engagement with his own position from the very beginning of Being 
and Time.  In the section on method (§7) Heidegger explains he will let the 
phenomenon under investigation be seen by others through apophantic speech.  For 
Heidegger, apophantic speech entails the possibility of either discovering things or 
covering them up precisely because logos as apophansis is a mode of making 
manifest by indicating, that is, the statement indicates that which it points out, letting 
it be seen apart from itself (diairesis) together with something else (synthesis).182  
That is, this particular mode of making manifest, logos as apophansis, also brings 
with it, according to Heidegger, the possibility of covering over what shows 
inasmuch as it is a manner of showing something apart from itself and together with 
something else, that is, the statement makes something manifest as something.  By 
this account, a statement that shows something just as it shows itself is true, whereas 
a false statement shows something as something other than what the thing shows 
itself as.  In this way Heidegger explicitly acknowledges his interpretation could be 
either true or false and is therefore open to critique and invites others to critically 
engage with his ideas. 
Likewise, Heidegger’s understanding of the phenomenological standpoint is 
also essentially critical.  Practicing phenomenology means remaining ‘self-critical in 
a positive sense,’183 that is, open to rethinking even the most clear and distinct 
concepts.  For only as autochthonous can concepts be phenomenological.  In other 
words, as we saw in chapter one, phenomenological concepts are meaningful only in 
terms of the unique historical context in which they arise.  If a phenomenological 
concept loses its autochthony and becomes a free-floating thesis, severed from the 
original historical context, then it is no longer phenomenological but rather has 
become theoretical, stagnant and “common” in accord with the predominance of the 
                                                
181 Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," 152 
182 Heidegger, Being and Time, 149 [159] 
183 Heidegger, Being and Time, 34 [36] 
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theoretical standpoint that Heidegger bemoans.184  In this way, a concept that was 
possible to account for in regard to actual situations becomes taken as some kind of 
unchanging concept.  Consequently, a kind of critical engagement is written into the 
very way Heidegger thinks philosophical investigation should unfold. 
Thus, contrary to Tugendhat, I argue that Heidegger does maintain the 
possibility of critical engagement with his own thinking and that of others.  I suggest 
this for a number of reasons.  Firstly because, as already noted, for Heidegger, 
correctness still functions at the level of assertion.  Secondly, and in addition to what 
I have just noted above, we can engage with Heidegger’s account critically, but not 
by merely subjecting statements to scrutiny with respect to the formal rules of logic.  
Rather, Heidegger demands of us that we follow the movement of showing and see 
for ourselves whether Heidegger brings to light the phenomenon he considers in his 
particular practice of phenomenological-hermeneutics. 
From Heidegger’s perspective, the truth of the statements offered in his own 
philosophical works, like any statements, cannot be grasped in isolation from their 
context, or from the movement of showing peculiar to these works.  This is how 
Heidegger thinks we ought to engage with each other’s interpretations.  Additionally, 
as I pointed out in chapter one, the phenomenological-hermeneutic method involves 
an interrogation of the concepts in terms of which we understand ourselves and our 
surrounding world, which in turn, requires a consistently self-critical attitude.  
As part of this general philosophical project, we can also critically engage with 
our own understanding by directing ourselves toward the concepts we have been 
handed down by tradition.  These concepts are so familiar and self-evident that their 
meaning often goes unnoticed, while, at the same time failing to speak to our unique 
historical situation.185  
                                                
184 See also: Martin Heidegger, “The Problems of Presuppositions,” in Towards the Definition of 
Philosophy, translated by Ted Sadler, (London & New York: Continuum, 2002), 65-79 
185 For an example of how this will play out in a specifically philosophical framework, we need go no 
further than Heidegger’s philosophy itself. Consider for example, his account of modern technological 
civilisation. See especially: Heidegger, "The Age of the World View," 340–55; Martin Heidegger, 
"The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
translated by William Lovitt, (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 3–35; Martin Heidegger, What is a 
Thing? Translated by W. B. Barton, Jr. & Vera Deutsch with an analysis by Eugene Gendlin, 
(Indiana: Gateway Editions Ltd., 1967); and, comments more generally on this topic throughout 
Heidegger’s oeuvre. 
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Finally, Heidegger’s account of alētheia as the essence of truth cannot be 
collapsed back into the concept of truth as correctness.  Such a collapse is entirely at 
odds with the fundamental finding of Heidegger’s exploration of truth.  From the 
account of alētheia as the essence of truth and Heidegger’s understanding of the 
relationship between “method” and phenomena, we can formulate a response to 
Tugendhat’s critique that differs from those offered by Smith and Dahlstrom. 
§6 Tugendhat and Heidegger on Certainty, Method, and the Things 
Themselves 
Both the account of alētheia as the essence of truth and phenomenological-
hermeneutics as a critical approach not only show that Tugendhat’s criticisms are 
problematic but also that the problems Tugendhat formulates bear a commitment to 
presuppositions that Heidegger explicitly opposes, and, in fact, is trying to call into 
question through his investigation into the meaning of truth. 
If Heidegger’s approach is critical in the sense outlined above, then we can 
assume that Tugendhat understands something different by “critical engagement” 
when he claims that Heidegger’s account of truth makes such critical engagement 
impossible.  As we saw in chapter two, Tugendhat argues that Heidegger gives up 
the notion of truth as certainty that in Tugendhat’s view must remain as a regulative 
idea.186  It is this notion of truth as a regulative idea that for Tugendhat guides the 
process of critical questioning.  Heidegger gives up this regulative idea, according to 
Tugendhat, by equating truth and alētheia.  However, as I have shown, Heidegger 
does not abandon the notion of truth as certainty but rather attempts to ground it in 
the essence of truth as alētheia. 
Moreover, Heidegger is critical of accounts of truth such as Tugendhat’s that 
bind truth to the confines of certainty.  According to Heidegger, the ‘precedence of 
certainty over truth leads to conceiving truth itself as certainty.  Here the precedence 
of procedure (method) over content is at stake.’187  That is to say, Heidegger would 
suggest that Tugendhat’s understanding of truth as a regulative idea reduces truth to 
a methodological procedure that can be applied in all manner of investigations.  This 
is untenable from a Heideggerian perspective.  In Heidegger’s view, and as we saw 
                                                
186 Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 90 
187 Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, 30; see also Heidegger, 
Introduction to Phenomenological Research, 91-92 
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in chapter one, we must first have an understanding of what it is we are investigating 
before we can say with confidence what method is most appropriate to this 
investigation.  Heidegger’s conception of method entails an acknowledgement of the 
historical situatedness of our inquiries.  To give method precedence over content 
means to decide what shows a priori.  Tugendhat’s understanding of truth is such a 
way of limiting what can show up in philosophical investigation because it demands 
in advance a criterion in terms of which all phenomena must be examined. 
I suggest that from Tugendhat’s perspective, the notion that his commitment to 
a concept of truth – limited to certainty – leads to a precedence of method over 
content would not be problematic.  It is precisely his aim to uphold it.  As we saw in 
chapter two, Tugendhat thinks that Heidegger is correct to emphasise that our access 
to things themselves is mediated by a historical meaning horizon.  However, as was 
also shown in chapter two, Tugendhat believes that Heidegger does not properly 
incorporate this insight into his account of truth because, by his account, Heidegger’s 
interpretation of truth as alētheia assumes immediate and direct access to things 
themselves.188  
Tugendhat would claim that without some method for properly assessing 
different claims, the method derived solely from our historical situatedness leads to 
relativism.  In Tugendhat’s view, the method cannot be made to adapt to different 
kinds of “historical content” precisely because he believes we do not have access to 
things themselves.  Only a correct method – in this instance a proper understanding 
of truth – allows for the distinction between truth and falsity and thus overcomes, to 
some limited extent, the fact that we always interpret phenomena within a historical 
meaning horizon. 
However, as we have already seen with respect to Heidegger’s 
phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, Heidegger does not rest content with what 
initially shows.  Nor does he claim to have a kind of exhaustive insight into what 
                                                
188 Tugendhat also makes this point in Traditional and Analytic Philosophy: Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Language. Tugendhat is critical of what he takes to phenomenology’s appropriation of 
the Greek notion of noein as “intellectual intuition.” For Tugendhat, we engage in no such “simple 
seeing,” rather our perception/understanding is always mediated by a linguistic horizon. It is in this 
vein that he speaks of language-analysis as clarifying what has already been understood; that is, he 
writes, ‘here it is a question of making clear what is unclearly sensed; and for this I have no intuition 
at my disposal - only linguistic usage.’ Heidegger also speaks of explicating what has already been 
understood, yet what constitutes and characterises this pre-understanding according to Heidegger is at 
odds with the manner Tugendhat conceives of it. See: Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical 
Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language, 71 
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things “really” are.  In this light, an interpretation of truth as alētheia does not entail 
an immediate access to some notion of the “true meaning” of things.  What initially 
shows, that is, our everyday and average understanding, is not the point at which 
Heidegger is happy to end his philosophical investigation.  It is precisely our 
common and unquestioned understanding of things that, in Heidegger’s view, require 
phenomenological-hermeneutic questioning and analysis.  Heidegger wants to bring 
into view and make explicit the presupposed grounds in terms of which our concepts 
are meaningful.  Tugendhat interpretation of the notion of truth as alētheia, implying 
a direct access to things themselves, that is, things as they “actually” or “really” are, 
attributes to Heidegger a philosophical contentment with what constitutes our 
everyday understanding.  On the contrary, as I have suggested, this is precisely 
where Heidegger believes phenomenological-hermeneutic analysis must commence. 
Tugendhat’s preference for method over content, his contention that one must 
first start with a particular notion of truth (even as only a regulative idea) that can be 
universally applied, is grounded upon a presupposed separation of what shows 
(phenomena) from things themselves.  For Tugendhat what shows are not things as 
they “really” are, that is, the things themselves; rather, what shows are mere outward 
appearances, emanating from the thing themselves.  The things themselves remain 
forever veiled.  The question arises as to how we can account for these “mere 
appearances.” 
By contrast and as I already explained in chapter one, Heidegger contends that 
there is a necessary distinction between phenomena and appearance and that 
phenomena must be aligned with things themselves.  As noted above, it is the 
opposite for Tugendhat: he aligns appearance and phenomena, and separates 
phenomena from things themselves.  Heidegger would be fundamentally opposed to 
these divisions and alignments made by Tugendhat.  In Heidegger’s view, a concept 
of what things “really” are as something separate from what shows is itself a 
presupposition that originates in a particular historical context.  To start out from this 
concept of things as they show themselves, as somehow separate from things as they 
“really” are, without first looking back into the origins of this thesis is from 
Heidegger’s perspective precisely to pass over things as they “really” are.  As noted 
in chapter one, concepts that have become detached from the original context are no 
longer autochthonous but rather theoretical.  In this way, inquiry that takes the 
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separation of what shows from the things themselves as its point of departure 
assumes a theoretical standpoint, which Heidegger calls into question. 
Any notion of correct method presupposes an understanding of that which it is 
to provide appropriate access to.  For Heidegger, the distinction between what things 
“really” are and what shows is bound to a methodological approach and assumes a 
particular theoretical standpoint.  In “Alētheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16),” he 
writes: 
We are too quick to believe that the mystery of what is to be thought always lies 
distant and deeply hidden under a hardly penetrable layer of strangeness.  On the 
contrary, it has its essential abode in what is near by, which approaches what is 
coming into presence and preserves what has drawn near.189  
For Heidegger, the proper (phenomenological) concept of method must be drawn out 
of what shows and not be presupposed in advance (dictating and limiting what 
shows).  This is what Tugendhat does when he starts out from a notion of phenomena 
as separate from things themselves and assumes a position according to which truth 
is understood merely in terms of correctness.  In this instance the method determines 
the object of investigation.  Therefore, from a Heideggerian perspective, Tugendhat’s 
theoretical starting point is precisely that which Heidegger questions through his 
critical engagement with the traditional concept of truth.  
§7 The Task of Thinking 
Having shown the problems with Tugendhat’s critique and Dahlstrom’s and 
Smith’s defences of Heidegger’s concept of truth, I now return to Heidegger’s 
remarks in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.”  I quote the passage 
again: 
Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional “natural” sense as the correspondence 
of knowledge with beings demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is 
interpreted as the certainty of the knowledge of Being, alētheia, unconcealment in the 
sense of the opening may not be equated with truth.  Rather, alētheia, unconcealment 
thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth.  For truth itself, just as Being 
and thinking, can only be what it is in the element of the opening.  Evidence, certainty 
in every degree, every kind of verification of veritas already move with that veritas in 
the realm of the prevalent opening.  Alētheia, unconcealment thought as the opening 
of presence, is not yet truth.190  
As noted in chapter two, both Apel and Lafont claim that Heidegger acknowledges 
the power of Tugendhat’s critique and in turn retracts the position he has held since 
                                                
189 Heidegger, “Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16),” 121 
190 Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” 69 
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Being and Time, denying that alētheia is truth in the most original sense.  However, 
their claim does not do justice to Heidegger.  I suggest that Heidegger does not seem 
to make any such retraction of his earlier account of truth.  For he is clear when he 
specifies that it is truth ‘understood in the traditional “natural” sense’ that is, in the 
sense of ‘correspondence’ or ‘certainty’ which cannot be understood as alētheia.191  
In other words, Heidegger is not retreating his earlier position with respect to 
alētheia as the essence and ground of the particular truths understood in the sense of 
agreement and certainty.  For as he continues: 
Alētheia, unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not yet truth.  Is 
alētheia then less than truth?  Or is it more because it first grants truth as adequatio 
and certitudo, because there can be no presence and presenting outside of the realm of 
the opening?  This question we leave to thinking as a task.192  
The clearing, alētheia, as was shown in chapter one and reiterated throughout this 
dissertation, is not a particular truth; it is not something that is true.  Rather, alētheia 
grants the possibility of particular truths taking the form of agreement or certainty; 
alētheia is the clearing that allows the accordance of statements and things to 
essentially unfold.  Thus, when Heidegger claims that truth as alētheia cannot be 
equated with truth understood as agreement or certainty, he is not disavowing his 
earlier position with respect to the essence of truth, truth as alētheia.  Instead, he 
affirms his commitment to question the ground on which our concepts rest.193  We 
cannot understand let alone accept Heidegger’s determination of truth as alētheia if 
we remain within the tradition of thinking that accepts the concept of truth merely in 
terms of correctness.194  To rethink this traditional concept of truth, this is the task of 
thinking Heidegger leaves us with.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that Heidegger’s idea of truth as alētheia does not 
entail giving up the possibility of critical inquiry.  Furthermore, I have shown that 
what Tugendhat finds lacking in Heidegger’s interpretation (truth as adaequatio and 
                                                
191 ibid. 
192 ibid. 
193 To contest the notion that Heidegger retracts his account of truth as alētheia (that his later position 
contradicts his earlier one) is one claim, but to assume a linear narrative of Heidegger’s work is 
another and much more dubious one at that. We pass over the significance of Heidegger’s journey if 
we say that Being and Time was merely the foundation for his later thought.  
194 For similar points made by Dahlstrom and Malpas, see: Daniel Dahlstrom, "The Clearing and Its 
Truth: Reflections on Tugendhat's Criticisms and Heidegger's Concessions," 18-19; Malpas, "The 
Twofold Character of Truth: Heidegger, Davidson, Tugendhat," 256. 
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as certitūdō) is in fact maintained in Heidegger’s account, albeit grounded in the 
essence of truth as alētheia.  However, my purpose was not merely to suggest that 
Tugendhat’s critique is somehow misguided or misleading, though I argue that it is.  
Rather, Tugendhat’s engagement with Heidegger and the response it prompts results 
in a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his general 
approach to philosophical problems.  This latter aspect is often forgotten in debates 
about particular topics in Heidegger’s works.195  
By bringing Tugendhat’s presuppositions into view, we clarified why 
Heidegger’s account does not suffer from Tugendhat’s criticisms.  We also saw that 
Tugendhat’s presuppositions are precisely those that Heidegger seeks to unsettle in 
his critical engagement with the concept of truth.  Foremost among these 
presuppositions are his theoretical starting point, his privileging of method, and his 
separation of phenomenon from the thing itself. 
 
 
                                                
195 Malpas and Kockelmans are exceptions to this tendency to overlook the significance of the 
hermeneutic aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy and the role it plays in his analysis of truth. See: 
Malpas, "The Twofold Character of Truth: Heidegger, Davidson, Tugendhat"; Joseph Kockelmans, 
On the Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984) 
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Conclusion 
In this dissertation my aim was to show the problems that arise when assessing 
Heidegger’s concept of truth in isolation from his larger project.  Central to this 
larger project was the attempt to question the tradition of Western metaphysics and 
the presuppositions that we inherited from this tradition.  In Heidegger’s view, the 
concept of truth as no more than correctness is fundamentally rooted in this tradition. 
I argued that Tugendhat and his followers do not take into account Heidegger’s 
general philosophical project and the way it led him to question the concept of truth 
as correctness.  In the end, they reinstate presuppositions in their account of truth that 
are precisely what Heidegger is bringing under question.  In some respects, these 
were the very presuppositions Heidegger was trying to call into question through his 
investigation into the concept of truth.  At the same time, I suggested that thinking 
through Tugendhat’s critique and attempting to formulate an adequate Heideggerian 
response gives us a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his 
general philosophical project. 
I drew upon Heidegger’s account of truth and method in Being and Time, as 
well as some of his later works, to show why – from Heidegger’s perspective – the 
secondary commentary contains some of the same limitations as Tugendhat’s 
critique.  Finally, in light of these limitations, I formulated what I argue is an 
alternative response to Tugendhat’s criticisms.  
I showed that Heidegger’s idea of truth as alētheia does not entail giving up the 
possibility of critical inquiry.  For Heidegger, phenomenological-hermeneutical 
philosophy is fundamentally critical.  Acknowledging alētheia as the ground of truth 
(as the essence of any and every particular truth) in no way precludes critical 
questioning.  Furthermore, I showed that contrary to Tugendhat’s contention that 
truth as adaequatio and as certitūdō is abandoned in Heidegger.  Heidegger in fact 
maintains the concept of truth as adaequatio and as certitūdō but grounds this 
concept of truth in the most original sense of truth as alētheia.  In order to clarify 
what Tugendhat finds problematic with Heidegger’s analysis of the traditional 
concept of truth, I drew attention to Tugendhat’s commitment to a conception of 
truth conceived strictly in terms of correctness, a position that Heidegger is trying to 
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call into question with his account of truth as alētheia.  However, I also stressed that 
Tugendhat’s engagement with Heidegger and the response it prompts results in a 
richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his general approach 
to philosophical problems.  
I contend that criticisms of Heidegger’s account of truth are often made 
without a full appreciation of his broader philosophical approach.  That does not 
mean that those criticisms are without force.  It is also quite possible that should a 
defender of Heidegger raise this broader framework, someone critical of Heidegger’s 
account of truth might very well also take issue with his broader philosophical 
approach.  Nonetheless, if we want to adequately understand Heidegger’s discussion 
of truth then we need to be clear about how this issue fits within his larger 
philosophical project. 
However, I have tried to do more here than simply make a Heideggerian 
response to Tugendhat.  By outlining Tugendhat’s presuppositions, namely, his 
theoretical starting point, his privileging of method, and his separation of phenomena 
from the things themselves, I suggest that Tugendhat’s criticisms of Heidegger 
(because they are founded upon these presuppositions) are not the last word in this 
debate.  Tugendhat’s presuppositions are precisely those that Heidegger seeks to 
unsettle.  Heidegger considers these presuppositions to be typical of many 
philosophical positions. 
Nonetheless, it was necessary to think through Tugendhat’s critique since his 
account of Heidegger, at least to some extent, has set the terms for the debate in the 
secondary literature.  For example, and as I have shown, even certain defenders of 
Heidegger (in this case Smith and Dahlstrom) make certain concessions to 
Tugendhat that Heidegger would not accept. 
I have framed the discussion so as to draw out of Heidegger certain criticisms 
of Tugendhat’s position.  That is, I have not merely attempted to defend Heidegger’s 
conception of truth, but have also shown how Tugendhat’s criticisms are themselves 
vulnerable to Heideggerian objections drawn from both his account of truth and his 
broader philosophical project.  
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